7 days that shook Turkey

Hayri Kozanoğlu

Turkey is going through turbulent days that seem to confirm Lenin’s famous words: “There are decades where nothing happens, and there are weeks where decades happen.”

While some had been pessimistically commenting on the public’s passivity saying things like “No one was held accountable for the Kartalkaya disaster, and society remained silent; look at Serbia and Greece, tens of thousands take to the streets to protest train crashes” a long-simmering anger and a still-vivid hope for change suddenly turned into a surge of energy. Hundreds of thousands poured into the streets and squares, forming long queues in front of CHP’s primary election ballot boxes in a show of “solidarity.”

We witnessed the chain of events unfold: the cancellation of İmamoğlu’s diploma, his detention the very next morning, and then his arrest; and the social opposition’s move to the streets. Judging by developments so far, RTE appears to have made the riskiest and most misguided move of his political life. It would not be an exaggeration to say that, should the social opposition follow the right course of action, his political career may be nearing its end.

Summarising the gains achieved so far, the risks ahead, and the key parameters of domestic and foreign policy in 10 points could prove useful in helping us see the road ahead and plan for the future.

1– The increasingly oppressive climate, the renewed attempts to criminalise the Gezi uprising with new additions, and the baseless interrogations, prosecutions, and in some cases arrests of politicians, journalists, trade unionists, and businesspeople all alongside ever-worsening economic conditions for ordinary citizens had been fuelling public discontent. The fact that all this was being communicated to the public in a crude, aggressive, and shameless tone only deepened the simmering anger. The unfounded accusations against İmamoğlu ranging from the cancellation of his diploma to corruption and even forming a terrorist organisation mobilised all elements of the social opposition: young people, women, defenders of the Republic and secularism, and pensioners struggling to make ends meet. A powerful collective energy has been unleashed. From this point on, it is of great importance to close ranks and focus not on differences but on common ground.

2– With its rhetoric of “normalisation” and “reconciliation,” the CHP had been unable to sever ties with the AKP regime, effectively experimenting with a kind of shared modus operandi. However, during this process, the party overcame its fear of the streets. While it had previously pointed to the ballot box in every resistance, strike, or student movement, the successive imprisonments of locally elected officials just a year after their election revealed the futility of a struggle confined solely to the vote. By turning Saraçhane into its headquarters and recognising the value of the masses’ own strength, Özgür Özel proved himself at the podium as a resolute leader. It has become increasingly clear that the ballot box and the streets are not mutually exclusive but, on the contrary, dynamics that feed and strengthen one another.

3– Since the 1960s, young people have played a major role in every wave of social awakening in Turkey through their excitement, dynamism and courage. The discussions and intellectual formation that take place during university years have also left their mark on the country’s intellectual life. Under the AKP regime’s highly repressive and punitive climate, political appointments imposed on universities have stifled the atmosphere of free debate. Students were disciplined, and their sensitivity to social issues was deliberately dulled. Yet, on Wednesday, 19 March, when İstanbul University students broke through the barricades, it was as if a “sleeping giant” had awakened, releasing a powerful youth dynamic. University students, as one of the main subjects of the resistance, took their place at the forefront.

4– The so-called “new peace process,” widely interpreted as beginning with Bahçeli’s flattering remarks about İmralı, has put those who sincerely want a resolution to the Kurdish issue in a difficult position. It has become clear that this new initiative is being used as a lever to sustain the regime and extend the reign of the One-Man rule. In the medium to long term, it would be impossible for Kurds to experience true freedom under a consolidated authoritarian regime. There is also no solid basis for the expectation that a coalition of jihadist forces in Syria led by HTŞ and greenlit by US imperialism would bring about a democracy that Kurds could benefit from. Despite symbolic gestures around Newroz celebrations, the fact that the “Urban Consensus” in the İmamoğlu investigation was treated as a crime, and that steps based on the understanding of the Kurdish movement as a legitimate social force were penalised, has served as a wake-up call. The solidarity shown by the DEM Party during the Saraçhane resistance, and Özgür Özel’s careful efforts to repair the hurt caused by earlier remarks offensive to Kurds, offer hope that the Urban Consensus can be carried from rhetoric into the streets.

5– The lack of reaction from Erdoğan’s own base even to his fiery iftar speeches, and the unenthusiastic, disengaged reception of his agitational messages, suggest that his latest move has failed to resonate even within his core constituency. It is likely that the increasingly middle-class conservative segments, who are also vulnerable to economic shocks, are beginning to feel uneasy. The open opposition expressed by the İyi Party and the Zafer Party to the government’s crackdown, and the shift of secular-nationalist voters toward the opposition, indicate that not only is there no breach being opened in the opposition front, but the ruling People's Alliance (Cumhur İttifakı) is struggling to maintain its own unity. There is growing suspicion that Erdoğan is no longer able to effectively activate the mechanisms of persuasion and consent even within his own ranks.

6– The fact that Erdoğan launched the operation immediately after a phone call with Trump has fuelled interpretations that he drew boldness or even approval from Washington. It’s true that Trump, unlike his predecessors, does not include human rights, democracy, or freedoms in his diplomatic “bargaining,” not even as a formality. His mindset is one based purely on power and dominance. Nevertheless, Erdoğan is staking everything on the assumption that Trump prefers to work with strongmen. But if Erdoğan continues to struggle to govern his own country, fails to win over his own people, and appears increasingly unstable, he may well fall out of favour with Trump too.

7– The timing of these moves coinciding with a moment when Europe most needs Turkey may appear advantageous at first. The EU has embarked on a path to securing its own defence and is allocating substantial budgets for this purpose. Turkey possesses NATO’s second-largest army. It also holds the potential to supply manpower to make up for the shortage of soldiers among European countries, and its defence industry has reached a level that could fill some of the EU’s gaps in arms and ammunition production. Moreover, it holds the trump card of over 5 million refugees. However, Brussels is unlikely to easily tolerate a regime that so blatantly tramples bourgeois democracy underfoot. The support shown to İmamoğlu by the mayors of 20 metropolitan municipalities led by the opposition is a promising beginning. In fact, aside from Italy, no major European country is currently governed by a far-right administration. Additionally, the fact that far-right, fascist parties allied with Trump feed on anti-Islamic and anti-minority sentiment also poses a disadvantage for Erdoğan when it comes to finding external allies.

8– With the immediate surge in foreign exchange, rapidly rising bond yields, and a plunging stock index, the markets gave a sharp reaction to the crackdown. The core of Mehmet Şimşek’s “rational” economic policy was to attract hot money through high interest rates, thereby strengthening foreign exchange reserves and keeping the depreciation of the lira below the rate of inflation in order to contain price increases. Yet, more than $20 billion in reserves were lost within the first few days. A deeper collapse is being held off through various mechanisms raising overnight interest rates, negotiated foreign currency sales, FX deposit operations, and finally liquidity bills. But all of this means even higher interest rates. In the coming months, this translates into a more suffocating economy, a near standstill in investment, shrinking demand, a looming recession, and soaring unemployment. Moreover, the post-2023 election economic prescription encouraged borrowing in foreign currencies. With sudden exchange rate swings, the private sector is now facing a foreign exchange gap that could lead to bankruptcies. Unless an unlikely massive influx of foreign currency occurs, no clear path remains for relieving the economy.

9– Just like during the Gezi resistance, there is no single reason driving people into the streets. Alongside protests against injustice and lawlessness symbolised by the victimisation of İmamoğlu are the struggles of workers whose living conditions are deteriorating, pensioners pushed into poverty, and those crushed under the weight of credit card debt. Youth are also playing a significant role in the protests, reacting to the bleak future ahead of them and the disregard for merit in the face of cronyism and religious sect networks. In 2014, during the Gezi process, inflation had fallen to 7.5% and Turkey had been rated as a country suitable for investment. The government thus had some economic room to manoeuvre. Today, however, it is impossible for the ruling bloc to make any economic moves that could improve the lives of the masses or absorb their anger. For this reason, the growing inflation in the coming days will inevitably increase poverty, misery, and consequently public dissent.

10– In the days ahead, the social opposition cannot limit itself to protest actions alone. It is vital to also raise basic demands that can form the foundation of broad consensus. The first demand must, of course, be the release of all political prisoners “from İmamoğlu to Demirtaş, from Özdağ to Atalay.” This should be accompanied by economic and social demands such as improving pensioners’ conditions, cancelling or restructuring interest on credit card debt, and banning dismissals. Alongside using the power of consumption against pro-government companies, it is also crucial to mobilise the power that comes from production. The collective energy seen in the squares must be carried into workplaces, schools, and neighbourhoods, with the goal of building lasting, democratic organisational structures. This way, the farewell to this government can be accelerated joyfully, with songs, creative slogans, and sharp humour.

Note: This article is translated from the original Turkish version titled Türkiye’yi sarsan 7 gün, published in BirGün newspaper on March 25, 2025.