A cross-border far-right dynamic is at work

Sarya Toprak

In recent years, attacks on the acquired rights of women and LGBTQ+ people have been increasing in many countries. These attacks are considered an important part of authoritarian political projects.

Policies built around the discourse of “gender ideology” are legitimized under the pretext of protecting the family and “national values,” while simultaneously weakening democratic institutions.

Hungary According to Judit Takács, Research Professor at the Center for Social Sciences, this process is not unique to a single country. The setbacks experienced in Hungary under Viktor Orbán's administration are part of a broader political pattern. Takács emphasizes that similar strategies have been implemented in countries such as Turkey, Italy, and the United States.

In our interview with Judit Takács, we discussed the setbacks in Hungary, the “illiberal state” model, and its similarities from Turkey to the United States.

Orban's administration: What were the most significant setbacks for women's and LGBTQI+ rights?

Steps were taken systematically. In 2020, the Hungarian government withdrew its ratification of the Istanbul Convention on preventing violence against women, describing it as a threat of “gender ideology.” That same year, it legally banned the recognition of transgender and intersex individuals by defining gender as biological and immutable. Funding for gender studies programs was cut, and these programs were effectively banned from state universities in 2018. The 2021 “anti-pedophilia” law (often referred to as the “child protection law” by members and supporters of the Hungarian government, while LGBTIQ NGOs refer to it as the “gay propaganda law”), partially modeled on relevant Russian legislation, banned the depiction of homosexuality or gender transition in content accessible to minors and severely restricted it in education, media, and public spaces. The constitution was amended to define marriage solely as between a man and a woman and to add the phrase “a mother is a woman, a father is a man,” while the adoption rights of same-sex couples were also restricted. Abortion, while technically legal, was made difficult in practice. Meanwhile, women remain significantly underrepresented in political institutions, and the government ignores structural issues such as gender pay gaps and domestic violence.

How do anti-gender policies, combined with media control and judicial influence, form an authoritarian whole?

No single policy tells the whole story. It is the interaction between policies that creates authoritarianism. Anti-gender policies can legitimize emergency measures by presenting a consistent cultural enemy—the “gender ideology,” “Brussels bureaucrats,” “Soros-funded NGOs”—a very familiar model in Hungary, where decree-based governance has become a recurring tool of administration.

The Orbán government first declared a public health state of emergency during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, granting itself broad executive powers by decree, and has since maintained emergency provisions in various forms (most recently, the “war state of emergency” declared in response to Russia's war against Ukraine). It has thus effectively normalized a form of governance in which extraordinary measures have become the norm in political life. Media consolidation (by 2022, more than 500 media outlets had been transferred to owners close to Orbán through the Central European Press and Media Foundation “KESMA”) means that these narratives are reinforced without any meaningful counter-voice. The judiciary, reshaped by the creation of parallel administrative courts and the filling of the Constitutional Court, eliminates legal avenues for victims. Each pillar reinforces the others: courts do not challenge laws, media does not scrutinize laws, and laws seek to neutralize civil society organizations that could mobilize opposition. This is what academics like Bálint Magyar call the “post-communist mafia state”: it is not just a conservative administration, but a system in which power, law, and culture combine to reproduce the dominance of a single political network led by Orbán.You define genderphobia as part of a broader far-right agenda. Do you see structural similarities between the process in Hungary and developments in the US, Italy, and Turkey? The Hungarian example is not unique. In countries like Turkey, Italy, and the US, “genderphobia” functions not only as a social-conservative position but also as a political technology, and there are parallels. The common situation is a moral panic focused on protecting children, the systematic undermining of the legitimacy of academic expertise, and the use of “parental rights” as a weapon within a political framework. These are used simultaneously to solidify the electoral base and divert attention from the economic crisis. This is not just a series of parallel but interdependent developments. The strategy, rhetoric, and in some cases, funding transcend national borders, reflecting a transnational far-right political dynamic.

You mention that Budapest Pride 2025 is a turning point. Could you elaborate on this?

Budapest Pride 2025 has become a mirror in which the LGBTIQ+ community's vulnerability allows other citizens to see their own potential future under an authoritarian system. I define it as a “turning point” to emphasize the convergence of several factors: the scale of participation despite bans and political pressure, the visible presence of international solidarity, and the Pride march becoming a focal point for a broader democratic opposition—not just for LGBTIQ+ communities but for citizens protesting democratic regression more generally. This reflects a broader dynamic in which public events can become spaces of democratic resistance when the space for traditional opposition is closed off. However, it is uncertain whether this momentum will actually translate into structural political change.

Are mass movements like Pride merely identity-based actions, or are they part of a broader democratic resistance?

Pride marches are democratic in nature as well as identity-based. In authoritarian regimes, these two dimensions become inseparable. When the state defines a group as incompatible with the national fabric, that group's expression in the public sphere becomes a demand for democratic participation, pluralism, and limits on state power. Hannah Arendt's concept of “the right to have rights” may be useful here: “When a group is deprived of political recognition, its physical presence in the public sphere is in itself a claim to rights.” In Hungary, the Pride march attracted participants who were not LGBTIQ+ but saw the event as one of the few remaining spaces for open opposition. This mirrors the feminist marches in Poland and the Pride marches in Istanbul before they were banned. These actions were both identity-based and democratic demands. Such mass mobilizations also serve an important awareness-raising function. They make a community that official discourse tries to render invisible visible and show both participants and observers that they are not alone.

You define the process in Hungary as an “illiberal offer.” How can this process be reversed?

The concept of the “illiberal offer” frames Orbánism not as pure coercion but as a political bargain. The state offers (cultural, economic, demographic) security, a clear (Christian, Hungarian, family-centered) identity, and protection from perceived threats (such as immigration, “gender ideology,” Western liberalism). In return, it accepts restrictions on civil liberties, press freedom, and judicial independence. Many citizens accept this offer. Not because they are deceived, but because the offer addresses their real concerns. It is crucial to keep this in mind when considering reversal. Reversal requires a politics that addresses these concerns without scapegoating minorities, what some academics call a “counter-offer.” Institutional infrastructure also needs to be rebuilt. There is a need for an independent judiciary, a pluralistic media environment, freely functioning civil society organizations, and, of course, an election system that is not manipulated to guarantee Fidesz's supermajority. However, institutional change and transformation are extremely difficult within a system where the opposition has been co-opted.

Do the increasing “family-focused policies” in countries ruled by authoritarian regimes deepen gender inequality?

Yes, and this mechanism needs to be examined carefully. In authoritarian regimes, pro-birth family policies (generous family allowances, fertility-linked housing loans, tax exemptions based on number of children, etc.) are often presented as policies that support women. However, the underlying logic of these policies links women's social value to reproduction and motherhood, structurally disadvantaging women who do not fit this model (single women, childless women, LGBTIQ+ women, women prioritizing their careers). Furthermore, rather than supporting women's independent economic participation, they tend to reinforce gender-based division of labor by subsidizing the family as a unit. Research findings from Hungary show that these selective pro-birth policies primarily benefit middle-class and upper-middle-class families, but provide very little benefit to precarious workers or single mothers. We must observe that in authoritarian contexts, these policies cannot be separated from the project of building a non-liberal state. The “family” that must be protected is a political category that defines who belongs to the nation and who does not. This means that even materially generous family policies serve as a kind of normative coercion, rewarding those who conform to an imaginary family ideal and punishing those who deviate from it. Comparisons with Turkey and Russia show similar patterns. Selective birth incentives, combined with hostility towards feminist and LGBTIQ+ movements, reveal that the real aim is not to improve women's welfare, but to reproduce a certain social order demographically and ideologically.

Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Ulusötesi aşırı sağ bir dinamik işliyor, published in BirGün newspaper on March 8, 2026.