A new phase in Israel's expansion strategy: Iran
Yusuf Tuna Koç
In recent days, on the eve of nuclear talks between Tehran and Washington, tensions in the region escalated to a new level with Israel's attacks on strategic figures and locations in Iran.
The genocide in Gaza since 7 October, the partial occupation of Lebanon, assassinations targeting Hezbollah, regime change in Syria, bombings targeting the Houthis in Yemen, and repeated attacks on Iran are proof that Israel, with Western support, is continuing full steam ahead with its strategy to eliminate all resistance forces in the region. Although it is too early to see the extent of Iran's response, it is not difficult to draw a pessimistic picture of what may happen based on past conflicts.
However, it is still too early to predict where Israel's strategy of escalating tensions in the region will lead.
This week, we spoke with journalists Zeynep Gürcanlı and Hediye Levent and foreign policy expert Aydın Sezer about the reasons behind Israel's attack and the possible consequences of the current tensions.
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ZEYNEP GÜRCANLI: THE ATTACK HAS EASED THE NETANYAHU GOVERNMENT DOMESTICALLY
What do you think was the main reason behind Israel's attack on Iran? Could this be the first phase of a much longer war?
Zeynep Gürcanlı: What is happening does not point to a growing war, because Israel seems to have taken care to carry out targeted strikes rather than create a general conflict, targeting military commanders, nuclear physicists and uranium enrichment facilities.
Iran's first attack, on the other hand, was a blind attack. My guess is that Iran will definitely respond more seriously, but, just like Israel, it will be a pinpoint attack on Tel Aviv's nuclear facilities or military units, guided by intelligence units.
What position will Turkey take in this conflict?
Kürecik is a serious foreign policy issue.
For now, the US statement that it had no involvement in the Israeli attack is reassuring for Turkey. However, if the US or the UK become involved, the Kürecik NATO radar base will become operational. It is clear that the Tehran administration will be uncomfortable with this. Ankara needs to navigate a delicate diplomatic balance between NATO on one side and Iran on the other, without alienating either party.
Economically, the conflict puts Turkey at serious risk in two areas. The first is the increase in oil prices, and the second is the possibility of a decline in expected tourism income. Due to its proximity to the conflict zone, the perception of Turkey as a dangerous country may spread, especially in the West, which could deal a major blow to tourism income, which is much needed for the recovery of the Turkish economy, which is still in crisis.
The timing of the attack was critical. In terms of Israeli domestic politics, Netanyahu's government was facing a vote of confidence in the Knesset. The attack came on the very day of the vote. Thus, Netanyahu's government managed to rally Israeli public opinion behind it.
Secondly, nuclear talks between Iran and the US were scheduled to take place on Sunday.
The Trump administration was making serious efforts to prevent these talks from being overshadowed, but Israel carried out the attack by prioritising its own interests and acting without consultation. Indeed, the US administration was forced to state on several occasions that it was aware of the attack but did not intervene. Iran's response was to blame the US for the attack, even though it was carried out by Israel, and to withdraw from the nuclear talks. However, even if these talks had taken place on Sunday, no one expected a major breakthrough. This is because there are significant differences between the positions of the United States and Iran that are difficult to overcome. The United States had proposed a mechanism to ensure that Iran would abandon uranium enrichment and obtain uranium for peaceful purposes from outside sources. Iran, however, insisted on producing its own uranium rather than becoming dependent on other countries.
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HEDİYE LEVENT: SCARY SCENARIOS ARE NOT OFF THE SHELVES
Following Israel's attack, can we say that the nuclear agreement between the US and Iran has been shelved?
Hediye Levent: There had been talk for some time that Israel had intentions to attack Iran without US approval or support. Most recently, Trump had made a move in this direction, and talks on the nuclear agreement were continuing. The Israeli press recently reported that ‘Trump and Netanyahu spoke and agreed that there would be no attack before the agreement collapsed.’ With what has happened, we have seen that the US is unable to control Israel. If you ask me if this is possible, I would say yes. Israel is continuing its attacks on Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and Iran, and there is no deterrent force in the region or internationally that can stop these attacks.
Therefore, it came as no surprise that Israel struck Iran's military capabilities. However, this attack is critical for the nuclear agreement because, looking at Israel's tendencies so far, it may escalate its attacks in response to reactions to its move against Iran. That is why the next 24 hours are crucial.
We have seen before in the case of Lebanon that if Israel does not receive a serious response, it will continue its attacks. And if Israel is not convinced on this issue, we can say that the negotiations have collapsed, which creates the possibility that all kinds of risks, including a regional war, will begin to be discussed. However, we can see that the countries in the region, at least the Saudis, are uncomfortable with the statement.
How will Turkey be affected by this conflict?
Turkey's stance as a regional country is very important. Turkey is not a country that can stop Israel on its own. Moreover, a wider escalation could create different problems by triggering economic, political, border security and even new migration flows. Furthermore, Iran is crucial for Turkey's energy supply. Any disruption in energy supply could cause serious problems in the country. Frankly, we do not know how far Iran will go. As far as we can see, the attack targeted the Revolutionary Guards, but there was no aggression directed at the official army. Of course, only time will tell how far these attacks will go, whether they will be limited to the Revolutionary Guards or whether they will evolve into an attack that will shake Iran's military capacity, as Israel claims. It is still too early to say anything from this perspective.
The most frightening scenario, considering the strategy Israel has employed in Lebanon, would be a series of attacks targeting lower-level figures, which could escalate to higher-level figures depending on the response or lack thereof, creating an even more frightening scenario than the current one.
As I said, Saudi Arabia's stance will be more decisive here because Israel needs to maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia, both politically and commercially. Although Tel Aviv is very eager and insistent, the Saudis have not joined the normalisation process with Israel, so we need to see what stance they will take in this conflict.
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AYDIN SEZER: ISRAEL WILL NOT STOP UNLESS THERE IS A REGIME CHANGE
What do you think is the ultimate goal of Israel's attack?
Aydın Sezer: I do not think this attack is directly related to the nuclear agreement with the United States and Iran's nuclear infrastructure. As you mentioned, while negotiations were ongoing and there was even talk of a possible outcome, we need to look at the chronology of relations to understand the reason for such an attack without interrupting the negotiations. This is how I interpret what happened: a year and a half ago, after Hamas's attack on 7 October, Israel clearly stated that its security could not be guaranteed without the elimination of Iran and its proxy forces in the region, and announced that the current situation would escalate into a regional war.
Indeed, in the subsequent process, the Assad regime fell in Syria, southern Lebanon was occupied, and senior figures in Hezbollah, including Nasrallah, were killed, while attacks on the Houthis in Yemen continue. Therefore, when we consider the rest of Netanyahu's dangerous statement regarding Iran's proxy forces, it becomes possible to argue that the collapse of the regime in Iran will happen much sooner than we had anticipated. In his statement, Netanyahu said, ‘The Jewish and Persian peoples will live in peace, and Iran will be liberated.’ He had said these words even before the US elections, and indeed, Assad fell in Syria in December.
All of this shows that Israel is not very concerned about Iran's nuclear capacity build-up. Because there had been a peace process between the US and Iran before, but the US unilaterally withdrew with a much-debated decision, and now negotiations were being resumed.
However, Netanyahu has clearly set his mind on regime change. This attack was undoubtedly carried out with the knowledge of the US, but they seem to have bowed to Israel's will in taking such a decision, and it is clear that Netanyahu has the final say. Of course, the power of the Israeli lobby in the US must also be taken into account in relations between the two countries.
The US and the UK did not participate in the attack, but they have stated that they will support Israel if Iran attacks, so it is impossible to say that they are indifferent to what is happening. Frankly, I think the goal is regime change in Iran, and if that cannot be achieved, the aim is to weaken the regime to the point where it cannot recover.
Of course, another dimension revealed by this attack is that it is not something that can be achieved solely from outside with planes and missiles, but can also be carried out with sabotage from within Iran, which reveals that there is a very powerful Israeli intelligence infrastructure in Iran and that they are very successful. It is clear that they are receiving support from within Iran, probably from opposition groups.
Iran was only the target of Israel's attack, but when it wants to make a counterattack, it will be under a much wider siege. Trump already said that they knew about it and is making aggressive statements. The German chancellor also announced that they had been informed and that they would provide support from the sea if there was a response.
What role will Turkey play in such a conflict?
There are a few issues regarding Turkey. One is the role that the radar base will play in this conflict, because it makes a very significant contribution to monitoring Iran, and although not directly to Israel, there is a flow of information to NATO countries. Even if it appears to be beyond our control, there is support.
Turkey is not doing anything other than officially condemning the situation. There is constant loud opposition, but apart from that, we are not taking any practical steps, nor can we. This is necessary both in terms of Trump-Erdoğan relations and Turkey's Middle East policy. Moreover, we can say that we are helping Israel in its war against Iran's resistance forces by removing Assad in Syria, because after the regime change, Israel is the only power that is constantly expanding and gaining ground in the country. If this war lasts 10-15 days, it will affect us the most economically, which will ultimately affect the people on the streets. Apart from that, Erdoğan will deliver harsh messages after Friday prayers, but this will not create a situation that will produce results in practice.
Do you think the tensions will escalate?
Firstly, I do not think Iran has the capacity to respond to an attack of this magnitude. I do not think there is a possibility of a comprehensive attack as has been suggested. Secondly, all the countries in the region have announced that they will close their airspace and support Israel in the event of such an attack. Thirdly, considering the support of the United States and the United Kingdom, Iran cannot launch a very serious attack; it may be carried out through proxies in Yemen or another country, as has happened before. However, from Israel's perspective, it is now very clear that any development that could pave the way for regime change in Iran will be triggered.
Note: This article is translated from the original article titled "İsrail’in genişleme stratejisinde yeni evre: İran" published in BirGün newspaper on June 15, 2025.
