Ankara and HTS align on Syria

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The Middle East has entered a whole new phase following ousting Bashar Assad’s topple by the jihadist group Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). As the New Syria has become a podium for international powers after the geopolitical earthquake, the region is being redesigned according to the interests of the US and Israel.

Political analyst and writer Eva J. Koulouriotis, who is specialized in the Middle East and Syria, answered BirGün's questions about the future of Syria, which has become the focal point of the region.

What lies ahead for Syria under the rule of fundamentalist jihadists? What kind of Syria do American imperialism and Israel envision? 

Naturally, no one desires a Syria governed by a strict religious framework like Afghanistan under the Taliban. The majority of Syrians adhere to a more moderate form of Islam. In my conversations with numerous Syrians, including some who were previously part of armed groups (now integrated into the Syrian Ministry of Defense), a near consensus has emerged, focusing on two visions for the future: the first is a secular state, and the second is a state with an Islamic character similar to in the current Turkish style. While a minority advocates for the implementation of Islamic law, we’ll see what Syrian administration will do.

There is, of course, a divergence in regional and international perspectives on this issue. Within the region, Arab states have clearly accepted the new Syrian leadership, despite its previous history. On the other hand, it can be said that the only two states in the region that stand apart in their rejection of the current reality in Damascus are Iran and Israel. For Iran, the fall of Assad is a severe blow to their project in the region, as it means that Syria’s exit from their sphere of ​​influence, negatively impacts Hezbollah in Lebanon. As for the Israeli side, the current rejection of the new Syrian administration stems from concerns about the future of the Golan Heights, which Damascus considers occupied territory. In this context, Israel is trying to use the Kurdish militia in eastern Syria as a future bargaining chip in negotiations with Damascus.

Will the turning point occur east of the Euphrates? How will the conflict between the Syrian Democratic Forces, namely the Kurds, and Damascus be resolved? What do the actors in Syria want? What are the expectations of the Kurds? What does the Damascus administration aim to achieve? 

In his first address to the Syrian people, referred to as the "victory speech," Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa emphasized that one of his administration's top priorities is to restore the unity of all Syrian territory and extend the state's control over it. This statement clarifies the vision of the new Syrian administration for dealing with the situation in eastern Syria, which is currently under the control of the SDF militia. It also aligns with previous remarks made by al-Shara’a, who has repeatedly asserted that the areas east of the Euphrates will eventually come under Damascus' control, either diplomatically or militarily. Meanwhile, the SDF continues to hold firm to a set of demands and rejects the entry of forces from the new Syrian administration into the areas east of the Euphrates.

About two weeks after the fall of Assad, direct negotiations began between the new Syrian administration and representatives of the SDF militia in the Syrian capital, Damascus. These negotiations were characterized by an atmosphere of tension, as the SDF keep refusing to make concessions on their demands, which were identical to those they had been calling for from the Assad regime over the past three years. According to one of my sources familiar with these negotiations, the main demands of the SDF in these negotiations are as follows:

• Recognition of the self-administration in eastern Syria by the new Syrian administration.
• The participation of the SDF in the new Syrian government.
• Recognition of the Kurdish language in the new Syrian constitution as a second official language.
• Allowing the SDF to maintain control over the prisons in eastern Syria, where ISIS fighters are held.
• Ensuring the SDF retains the autonomy of its forces within the Syrian army.
• Guaranteeing that the self-administration in eastern Syria retains no less than 50% of the oil production in the region.
• Demanding the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syrian territory and for Damascus to mediate between the SDF and the Turkish government.

On the side of the new Syrian administration, they demanded modifications to some of these requests and outright rejected others. The issue of self-administration remains a major point of contention. The form of self-administration that the SDF is calling for would resemble federalism. However, Ahmad al-Shara'a’s administration displayed some flexibility with the idea that representatives of Kurdish political parties could manage local governance of the Al-Qamishli and Al-Hasakah governorates, while the Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor governorates would remain fully under the control of the Syrian government in Damascus.

Despite the new Syrian administration's acknowledgment of the rights of the Kurds as Syrian citizens and their right to learn in the Kurdish language, the SDF's rigid stance remains a significant obstacle to reaching an agreement. In my opinion, this intransigence stems from the SDF leadership's sense of American and Western support, bolstered by the continued presence of U.S. forces in eastern Syria. Additionally, support from Israel for the idea of self-administration in the eastern Euphrates has likely influenced the SDF's position.

Therefore, a diplomatic solution between the two sides is possible only if U.S. forces withdraw from Syrian territory, which would weaken the SDF’s negotiating position and force them to make further concessions.

Ultimately, the resolution of this issue depends on Trump and Erdoğan, and in Ankara’s ability to convince Washington to withdraw from Syria, or in Netanyahu’s ability to convince Trump to remain in Syria and continue supporting the SDF.

What is Türkiye’s role and influence in Syria? Will it achieve its objectives?

Some may see Türkiye as the biggest winner from the fall of the Assad regime via the armed Syrian opposition forces, and in my view, this is a logical assessment. Ankara, today, is less concerned. Furthermore, Syria, which is grappling with massive destruction, urgently needs reconstruction, a topic that the new Syrian administration has already discussed with Türkiye, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. A conference to support Syria's reconstruction is expected to be called soon, with participation from several Arab and Western countries. These reconstruction projects will present a significant opportunity for Turkish companies, which are geographically closer and more familiar with Syria’s reality, a development that will positively impact the Turkish economy.

From a security standpoint, Ankara feels more at ease regarding the future of eastern Syria and the militias affiliated with the PKK organization there. There is almost complete agreement between Ankara and the new Syrian administration on rejecting self- administration and the necessity for all foreign fighters to leave eastern Syria. This would allow the Syrian government to take control of all border crossings with Türkiye and Iraq, while also disbanding militias outside the state structure. I believe that Türkiye is fully aware of the sensitivity of this issue for the Americans and Europeans, which is why, just days ago, it agreed to dissolve all the armed groups it had supported and integrate them into the Syrian Ministry of Defense. This step confirms the alignment between Damascus and Ankara.

In a conversation I had with one of the officials of the new Syrian administration, he indicated to me that Damascus views Türkiye’s role as crucial in convincing the Trump administration regarding the issue of withdrawal from eastern Syria, thereby also addressing the SDF issue.

What outcomes might emerge from the negotiations between Türkiye, the US, HTS (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham), and the SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces)? How long will the U.S. presence in Syria under Trump’s America last? Where does Israel stand in this equation?

Under Trump's leadership in the White House, and despite his unpredictable nature and policies, there is a formula that can help us, as observers, anticipate his next moves, at least partially: profits and costs. Trump, as a businessman, tends to view every international issue through the lens of business, unless there is a personal stance he holds on to the matter. With this in mind, there are three main parties involved in eastern Syria: the Syrian administration, Türkiye, and the SDF. The key question is whether it is in Trump's interest to support the SDF’s position at the expense of his relations with Ankara and Damascus.

Trump’s alignment with the SDF would indeed strain relations with Ankara and complicate U.S. cooperation with Damascus on sensitive issues, such as combating ISIS in the Syrian desert, the Syrian-Israeli border, and the smuggling of Iranian weapons to Hezbollah. In return for what? Keeping U.S. forces in eastern Syria, which entails financial costs and the risk of their exposure to attacks from ISIS and militias backed by the IRGC, while the SDF's continued presence will be questioned.

When Trump adopted the decision to withdraw from eastern Syria during his first term, he faced pressure from Congress to reverse it, with the justification that the US withdrawal would benefit the Russians and Iranians. However, today, neither Iran nor Russia is active on Syrian territory after the fall of Assad. Therefore, the cost of maintaining US forces in eastern Syria and continuing to support the SDF outweighs the tactical gains that the Trump administration might derive from this decision.

In contrast, if the Trump administration adopts the decision to withdraw from eastern Syria while securing guarantees that include protecting Kurdish rights and preventing the resurgence of ISIS, it will positively impact relations between Washington and Ankara, which is crucial in the coming phase. Türkiye may be an important partner in any mediation and solution to end the Russian war on Ukraine, and such a move would also support Türkiye's efforts to finalize a deal for the purchase of F-16 fighter jets. Washington might also use this decision as leverage in negotiations with Damascus to ensure Israel’s security. By taking this approach, the Trump administration could close the issue in eastern Syria with limited costs, while addressing Israeli concerns as well.

How will the Syrian equation affect Middle Eastern geopolitics?

There is no doubt that the fall of the Assad regime is a geopolitical earthquake reshaping the power dynamics in the region. Iran is the biggest loser in the new balance of power, even though it has not fully matured yet. Losing Syria significantly weakens Iran's position, especially by diminishing its ability to support Hezbollah and curtailing its efforts to rebuild military capabilities effectively, as Syria served as the key route for transferring weapons from Iran to Lebanon. Moreover, the fall of Assad halts Tehran’s attempts to establish new influence in the West Bank, where weapons were being send from Syria to the West Bank via Jordan. On top of that, Iran's grip on Iraq could also be at risk of unravelling, further eroding its influence in the region.

With this Iranian decline, Ankara sees a significant opportunity to capitalize on this power vacuum by strengthening its relations with Damascus and addressing the threat posed by the PKK’s presence in eastern Syria. This may be reflected in the balances in Iraqi Kurdistan, with the growing level of rapprochement between Erbil and Ankara at the expense of the PKK in the Qandil Mountains.

Israel is also monitoring the changes in Syria and is seeking to exploit the situation by building a complex network of relations with the SDF in eastern Syria, as well as with the representatives of the Druze sect in the Suwayda Governorate in southern Syria. These cards are ones the Israeli government aims to use to pressure the new Syrian administration into making concessions on the Golan Heights file and the peace process between the two countries.

In the Lebanese arena, as is clear, Saudi Arabia has made a strong return to the political scene. With the backing of Washington, the Saudi role played a key part in the election of General Joseph Aoun as president and Judge Nawaf Salam as prime minister. This marks the first time in nearly four decades that both the president and prime minister of Lebanon are not aligned with the Assad regime or Iran.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, as is evident, a race has begun between Türkiye and Greek Cyprus over the issue of maritime borders with Syria and Lebanon.

Of course, these changes in the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East are still in their early stages, and the aftershocks of the fall of the Assad regime are likely far from over. The coming months could bring even more surprises.

Source: Suriye’de hesaplar iç içe