Erdoğan hits sharp bend: Tough walk on ice

Yaşar Aydın

Türkiye spent 2025 entangled in the regime’s strategy for survival. Many problems and this state of entanglement have carried over into 2026. For the government, the period of “getting by” has ended and the phase of a “crisis of existence” has begun. Every move we witnessed over the past year was in fact a makeshift fortress built against an approaching storm. If these fortresses are not reinforced in 2026, it will be hard for them to stand. In any case, it is already possible to say that 2026 is shaping up to be one of the narrowest bottlenecks in Erdoğan’s political career.

THE TRUMP, ISRAEL AND SYRIA EQUATION

The area where Erdoğan appears strongest, foreign policy, is in fact one of his weakest and most fragile fronts. The government is largely leaning on the United States in this field. Especially after the overthrow of Assad in Syria, the regional plan declared by Trump and Tom Barrack has tied Erdoğan’s hands. President Trump may praise Erdoğan at every opportunity but he also never fails to remind him of his “homework”. Cooperation with the Kurds in Syria, good relations with Israel, neutralising Iran and representing US interests in the Eastern Mediterranean are among the heavy items placed on Erdoğan’s table. In return, as far as can be understood, what was offered was what Barrack summed up as “legitimacy”, a promise of support to stay in power.

Erdoğan does not talk much about these issues and even appears to defend the old line in public. Yet the practice on the ground shows that US demands are being met. Even the token reactions from political Islamist circles and the government camp to the US attack on Venezuela confirm this new position. A foreign policy in which the strings are in the hands of Trump and Netanyahu is no different for Erdoğan than walking a tightrope.

WILL THE SCISSORS SHIFT WITH A “TERROR-FREE TÜRKİYE”?

The “terror-free Türkiye” discourse pursued by Devlet Bahçeli throughout 2025, and which by its appearance dragged Erdoğan along behind him, is clearly not independent of developments in Syria. A form of cooperation parallel to the setup created in Syria has also been envisaged for Türkiye. It is quite clear that Erdoğan and Bahçeli, bringing Öcalan into the picture as well, are planning a new political alignment that will keep DEM close to the government camp. The process carried out through the İmralı delegation, a parliamentary commission and inter-party visits continues almost without producing any concrete outcomes and as far as can be understood, it will proceed in this way.

Given the relationship established with the United States and the regional plan, Erdoğan and Bahçeli do not have many options. However, the existence of the process and the contacts established with Öcalan have created fault lines within the AKP and MHP bases, which have so far been consolidated through opposition to the PKK. The likelihood of these cracks growing is very high. On the other hand, the lack of concrete outcomes from the process strengthens question marks among the Kurdish population and does not change the position of Kurdish voters vis-à-vis the regime.

As a result, a process has been defined in which both AKP and MHP may be forced to abandon a politics they have pursued for nearly 40 years. If this road, seen by them as a compulsory “motorway”, turns into a dead end, the possibility that Erdoğan will once again flip the table has begun to be spoken about more loudly. At the same time, it is clear that Erdoğan’s hand is not as free as it was during the 2013 peace process. He now needs US approval for every step he takes. He will try to walk a thorny path between regional obligations and the expectations of his own electorate.

THE HEIR APPARENT CHOICE HAS INTENSIFIED THE FIGHT

One of the issues where Erdoğan will struggle the most will be managing both tensions within his party and those with the MHP. The most important development carried over from last year was the implicit declaration by the Erdoğan family and the Palace camp that Bilal Erdoğan had been chosen as heir apparent. As Bilal Erdoğan appears on the scene more frequently, this continues to trigger different sensitivities. If the issue were only who would be president after Erdoğan, it might be easier to overcome. But when the question becomes how the “Presidential Government System” designed for Erdoğan would function without him, all factions within the alliance, including the MHP, are mobilising. This situation is expanding to include debates about the regime itself.

It is in the nature of things that all sides are trying to secure a place in the struggle over the post-Erdoğan era. The fights in the media, the business world and party cadres are signs of this. 2026 will witness far more operations and file wars. The “new constitution” debate voiced by the MHP last week is not independent of this struggle. By proposing two vice presidents elected by vote and parliamentary approval for the cabinet, the MHP has in effect opened the door to a “semi-presidential” regime. The MHP has already sent a message to those saying “continue with Bilal Erdoğan”: “It’s not that simple, we need to reach agreement on certain points”. Although the need for Erdoğan for now keeps the conflict at the edge, as the hourglass runs backwards the process will become harsher.

SUPPRESSING PUBLIC ANGER IS DIFFICULT

Among all these headings, there is one that is preparing the end of the one-man regime with every passing minute: the regime can no longer produce consent in the eyes of the public. Millions who are becoming poorer, whose freedoms are being taken away and whose future has been stolen have cut their ties with the government. Nearly six years of uninterrupted impoverishment and the enormous gap in income inequality have accumulated great anger on the streets. The cry of “we cannot make ends meet” from millions is shattering the most high-flown political theories.

Even TÜİK data cannot hide the reality: the picture of Türkiye where the richest 20% of society take half of the income further fuels anger. In 2026, economic violence will no longer be just a matter of making a living but the biggest political crisis eroding the regime’s legitimacy. For Erdoğan, who can offer nothing but “patience” to masses with empty pockets, this year will be harder than all the others.

A PERIOD OF DISINTEGRATION…

Despite daily displays of power by Erdoğan and his team, they are at their weakest and most fragile moment in the 23 years since coming to power. The one-man regime will spend the whole of 2026 on ice. They are facing enormous problems, each capable of bringing down the government. Even a single mistake could bring absolute defeat. They themselves are aware that they would not be able to get back up after a small stumble.

Behind the showy displays of power lies a disintegrating government and a regime that has lost its legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Even if the government tries to make 2026 a year that is hard to endure for the opposition, the forces of social opposition are experienced in resisting such pressure. In 2026, it will be Erdoğan and the one-man regime that face the real test.

Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Erdoğan keskin viraja girdi: Buz üzerinde zorlu yürüyüş, published in BirGün newspaper on January 6, 2026.