Every front of foreign policy is falling apart

İlhan Uzgel

The AKP government has led Turkey into one of the most severe strategic defeats and foreign policy collapses in recent times. Let me begin by recalling a point I have reiterated many times in my previous articles and speeches. The consequences of foreign policy mistakes do not emerge the next day. The price paid is spread over time, the outcomes are grave, and although not impossible, reversing the losses is exceedingly difficult. The negative consequences of some Central Asian countries, encouraged by the EU, recognising the Greek Cypriot Administration as the Republic of Cyprus, opening embassies, and deciding not to recognise the TRNC, will be felt more acutely in the years to come.

Another crucial point must be underlined at the outset. The primary culprits in this process are not the Central Asian republics, the EU, or the Greek Cypriots. In the world, every country and actor plays its own game, doing whatever is politically necessary. If there is a problem or a weakness, it stems from the AKP governments that govern Turkey and make bold foreign policy claims they cannot substantiate. As citizens of this country, our counterparts are not the Greek Cypriots or Central Asian nations, but first and foremost the Erdoğan government.

WATCH THE TIMING!

With Trump’s arrival, the rift between the US and the EU, particularly over the Ukraine War, brought Turkey to the fore in terms of European security, increasing Turkey’s strategic importance. The Erdoğan government believed that it now held more cards and that its bargaining power had risen. Erdoğan, Hakan Fidan, and of course the pro-government journalists were brimming with confidence. At the highest level, they were declaring: “European security cannot be imagined without Turkey.” Within government circles, the belief prevailed that Europe, dismissed by Trump and wary of Putin, had fallen into Erdoğan’s hands and become dependent on him, and they eagerly spread this image to the public.

For these same circles, the need for Turkey in Ukraine and Syria had greatly increased, and Turkey had become the most critical country for energy security. In a climate of rising global tension, Europe was expected to build its strategic autonomy together with Turkey, and Turkey was to benefit from the financial resources allocated for this. This was the message they gave to the world and the public expectations they created.

The 4 April fiasco (in which EU countries signed an agreement with Central Asian Republics that included a clause not recognising the TRNC) occurred at a time when street protests were taking place, when the Central Bank sold 10 billion dollars in one day to stop the rise in foreign exchange rates, and when Turkey had turned inwards.

All the AKP government’s boasting was shattered when the EU inserted the recognition of Southern Cyprus into its latest Central Asia Global Gateway Investment Plan. The EU made a move that simultaneously inflicted massive damage on Turkey in the three most critical regions; Central Asia, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Europe. Never before in Turkey’s foreign policy history has there been a strategic collapse of this magnitude in three critical areas at once. This, too, has become a legacy of Erdoğan’s rule.

IN TERMS OF RELATIONS WITH THE EU...

1– The EU has made it crystal clear to Erdoğan the limits of Turkey’s strategic importance. With this move, Brussels effectively told Erdoğan, “don’t overestimate yourself.” It completely overturned Erdoğan and Fidan’s rhetoric and equation that “the EU needs us” and that they are merely “small countries hiding behind America.”

2– From now on, Erdoğan and Fidan will have to sit at the security-oriented negotiating table with the EU having conceded and absorbed this blow. If they respond to this move by avoiding cooperation on security issues, they will effectively be withdrawing from all their claims.

3– The situation is so dire that Turkey–EU relations had already ceased to be ‘values-based’ long ago, and the membership process had long been shelved. The government's hope was to reframe relations along a geopolitical axis favourable to itself in the new global context. The EU delivered its message in the very region and moment when Erdoğan claimed to be at his strongest and delivered it harshly. Thus, it also became clear that the bargaining chip-style give-and-take approach no longer works in relations with the EU.

Just as Erdoğan was pursuing a bargain similar to the 2015–16 refugee deal, the EU essentially sidelined Turkey and diminished Erdoğan’s significance via the Central Asian countries.

IN TERMS OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES...

Erdoğan had 20 years to strengthen his ties with the Central Asian nations. The earlier formations were renamed the Organisation of Turkic States in 2021. The Erdoğan administration, just like in the Middle East, claimed Central Asia was its domain too. These relations have now suffered a major blow. This failure in the region has also dealt a severe blow to both the idea and the ideal of a ‘Turkic world’. It has also undermined those who argued that ties with the Turkic republics should be further strengthened.

In the end, the countries closest to recognising the TRNC were the Central Asian republics. Yet they went and recognised the Greek Cypriot administration, opening embassies there. Diplomatically, what’s even more serious is that on 4 April, during a summit held in Samarkand, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed UN Security Council resolutions committing not to recognise the TRNC. So the issue is not just that they opened embassies in the south, it is also that they simultaneously pledged not to recognise the TRNC.

If there was ever a group of countries Turkey could lean on, it would have been the Central Asian republics. That possibility is now gone.

CYPRUS AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN...

The AKP government’s retreat from its ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean is not new. The process began around 2021, and this withdrawal (such as halting drilling or refraining from obstructing others who do) was the result of a behind-the-scenes bargain with the EU.

The Eastern Mediterranean had already become a scene of strategic defeat for Turkey. A country with the potential to be the region’s most powerful actor turned into its most isolated, most ineffective, and most marginalised one.

As for Cyprus, the government’s inconsistent policies from the very beginning are the main reason we have arrived at this point. While it created the expectation that the Central Asian countries would recognise the TRNC, the exact opposite occurred. The government was left crushed under the weight of this major failure.

Neither Erdoğan, nor Fidan, nor Binali Yıldırım the Chairman of the Council of Elders, the official body of the Organisation of Turkic States, could muster a single sentence in defence. They simply waited for this defeat to be quietly forgotten.

There is nothing to be said or done in the face of such a bitter strategic collapse by a country once seen as a potential EU member and the founder of the Turkic States organisation. Clearly, the government did not see this coming, had no means to prevent it, and failed to develop a counter-move.

Just like the military and energy cooperation between Gulf countries, Greece and Southern Cyprus has been established by bypassing Turkey, so too are the connections between Central Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean now being forged without Turkey. All of these are now marked as strategic losses for our country, ones that will be extremely difficult to reverse.

WHY DID THIS HAPPEN?

In truth, it is no surprise. Because for a long time now, there has been no coherent framework, trajectory, or strategy that could be called the foreign policy of a country of Turkey’s scale.

Turkey’s national capacity has been spent and continues to be spent on keeping the Erdoğan regime alive.

And the world treats a government that tries to exploit every regional development for its own benefit through short-term, petty bargains exactly as it deserves. As a result of this lack of policy, Trump at times insults with “don’t be a fool” and at others patronises with “you’re smart.” The EU, with a minor but lucrative move for the Central Asian republics, delivers a masterclass in deal-making diplomacy. On the international stage, what little reputation Turkey still had has been dragged further into the ground.

If you create this much volatility and distrust in foreign policy, the world will respond at a time and place of its choosing.

Within a short period, Turkey has suffered a major decline not only along the Central Asia–Eastern Mediterranean–Europe axis, but across all areas of foreign policy. In Syria, HTS imposed high customs duties, refused to admit Turkmens, and handed over the Latakia port to France. Airbases where Turkey wanted to establish a presence were bombed by Israel. Qatar began joint drilling with the Greek Cypriots. Meanwhile, the AKP and Erdoğan government has become mere spectators to developments that are generating long-term costs for the country.

On the diplomatic front, Qatar took the lead in Israel–Hamas talks, Saudi Arabia in Ukraine–Russia negotiations, and Oman in Iran–US talks. No one came knocking on Turkey’s door.

WHAT COULD (HAVE) BEEN DONE?

First and foremost, Turkey needs a real foreign policy. The recent developments have served as a lesson in how the international community treats a country that prioritises narrow Palace interests, bases its actions on daily bargains, lacks principles and direction, and is known for reneging on its promises and agreements at any given moment.

Turkey must overcome the fundamental problems that this government has ignored such as being a trustworthy partner in foreign policy, not declaring today’s allies tomorrow’s enemies and that is not possible under the AKP.

Without strengthening its institutions and restoring democracy, Turkey will not regain its former credibility and influence on the international stage.

Had Turkey been a democratic country with strong state–society relations, no legitimacy problems at home, adherence to the rule of law, and international prestige; had it been able to advance in its EU membership process, the EU could not have made such a manoeuvre. If Turkey had maintained its relations with the EU on the basis of principles and values, rather than sacrificing them for petty bargains, it would have become a vital part of the Global Gateway Initiative linking the EU to Central Asia—and the EU would not have acted this way. If relations with Central Asian countries had been built on solid ground, the matter would not have been reduced to a €12 billion long-term credit facility. These opportunities were sacrificed to keep Erdoğan in power—and the cost has been immense.

No one criticises countries that act rationally and fiercely protect their own interests. In fact, a bargaining-based approach is becoming more common. But even that relies on mutual benefit, trust, and predictability. Turkey’s position, reputation, and foreign policy in general have suffered a serious blow—and the international diplomatic and strategic community has taken note.

One of the most alarming aspects of this crisis is Turkey’s complete lack of any counter-move. A clear message has been sent to the world: we no longer have the tools or instruments to respond. Turkey has now become more vulnerable to future moves from abroad.

Recovering from this situation requires a strong, visionary, and national interest-focused paradigm shift.

Note: This text has been translated from the original Turkish version titled Dış politikanın her cephesi dökülüyor, published in BirGün newspaper on April 22, 2025.