Interview with Galip Yalman: Crisis, Order, and War

Yusuf Tuna Koç

In a period when global rules are eroding and power politics has become the defining factor, we spoke with Galip Yalman about the crisis dynamics of the capitalist system, the background of wars, and why a new order cannot be established.

Trump got off to a fast start in 2026. Even before the third month of the year has ended, we are already facing a tariff crisis, intervention in Venezuela, and now a war with Iran. Is such a rapid and aggressive shift a manifestation of a systemic crisis?

If you’d like, let me begin with a brief historical overview to better analyze the current situation. When you look at the period following World War I, and the events before and after the 1929 Great Depression, you don’t just see economic and political crises escalating to increasingly dire levels. You also see intense debates about how the capitalist system should function on a global scale.

In the final quarter of the 19th century, there was a power struggle among imperialist states, but alongside this, there was also a set of rules governing the functioning of the world economy—a framework known simply as the Gold Standard. This represented an international economic order centered on the United Kingdom but operating according to specific rules. In this system, which kept the value of the pound sterling fixed against gold, international trade and capital movements could be directed according to the preferences of the dominant states, even though the rules were occasionally violated. In short, it was a hegemonic project known as Pax Britannica.

Whether to return to the gold standard, which had been suspended with the outbreak of World War I, became one of the most critical issues as the war came to an end. In other words, the reestablishment of the pre-World War I international economic order held critical importance, particularly for the United Kingdom. Britain returned to the gold standard in 1925, but it did so based on pre-war parity. However, Keynes openly opposed this. According to Keynes, there was no convincing reason to believe that a return to the gold standard would restore the stability it was presumed to have provided before the war—neither in the international financial system nor in the national economy. On the contrary, if the gold standard were reinstated, countries would be forced to pursue deflationary policies in competition with one another, and the natural consequence of this would be rising unemployment and bankruptcies—outcomes that were by no means desired. Events would prove Keynes right; following a historic general strike in 1926 and the Great Depression of 1929, Britain would be forced to abandon the gold standard. Subsequently, the United States, which had adhered to the gold standard since 1900, also abandoned the system, while France did not and resisted. The debate was not limited to monetary policy. Under conditions where financial capital, demanding a return to the gold standard, played a decisive role in shaping political processes, the Weimar Republic’s credibility was shattered during the hyperinflation crisis triggered by the war reparations demands of the United Kingdom and France against Germany. Both in Germany and Italy, economic crisis and political instability brought fascism onto the historical stage. Consequently, the interwar period went down in history as a time when an international economic order based on the fundamental principles of capitalist states could not be established.

A SINGLE WORLD ORDER

As a result of the lessons drawn by the Roosevelt administration in the U.S. from this interwar period, the international economic order to be established after World War II—as it began to be described even before the U.S. entered the war—was envisioned as a “single world order.” In this vein, the U.K. and the U.S. had continued their planning efforts throughout the war. The Bretton Woods system was thus born. Based on this framework, it was envisaged that financial capital would be brought under control and capital controls on portfolio investments would be introduced to prevent the mistakes that were thought to have caused the crises of the 1920s from being repeated. The dollar-gold standard was established, and the IMF and the World Bank emerged as international institutions to ensure the functioning of this system.

Following the dissolution of the colonial empires in 1945, the established rules were not limited to the conduct of international economic relations. The sovereignty of nation-states and territorial integrity were also accepted as principled rules that must be strictly adhered to.

However, during the post-World War II transition, the international economic order that was established remained limited in its geographical scope. With the exclusion of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, the vision of a “single world order” did not materialize. In other words, regions where capitalist relations were not dominant were left outside the scope of the new international economic order led by the United States.

Interestingly, a single world system emerged in the post-1990 era. The Russian Federation, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, was transformed into a capitalist state. China, while the Communist Party remained in power, also integrated into the system. As a member of the World Trade Organization, China holds a defining position within the international economic order. It competes with the U.S. in certain areas of technology. However, characterizing the current situation as a “new Cold War” is not accurate. For what we are witnessing today is not a clash between two separate systems, but power struggles within the same system.

In this context, one can speak of a rupture between the pre-1990 and post-1990 eras; interestingly, U.S. President Bush had described the situation that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a “new world disorder.” Yet, in another sense, there is also continuity. It is important to consider this when discussing the present. The “balance of terror” created by the mutual possession of nuclear weapons since 1949 still prevails today. The true power of nuclear weapons stems not from their usability, but rather from their deterrent effect. Within the framework of the concept of limited war developed during this period, wars were fought with conventional weapons in specific regions—such as Korea and Vietnam—but there was no direct U.S.-Soviet conflict.

Before addressing the Trump administration’s attack on Iran in collaboration with Israel, it is necessary to highlight one more point. In the international literature, it is common to characterize systems established on the basis of both the gold standard and the dollar-gold standard following 1945 as rule-based orders. However, the Nixon administration’s decision on August 15, 1971, to end the convertibility of the dollar into gold would initiate a process leading to fundamental transformations within the Bretton Woods system. During this process, alongside the shift from fixed exchange rates to floating exchange rates, intergovernmental aid programs within the global capitalist system were gradually replaced by portfolio investments of financial capital, and ultimately, the removal of capital controls restricting capital movements became a reality. The 2008 global financial crisis exposed the fragility of this structure. Subsequent regulatory efforts were made, but a full-scale re-institutionalization could not be achieved. This is because financial markets diversified; non-bank financial market actors—referred to as “shadow banking” and not subject to regulation—gained prominence.

However, whether it be the approach of the so-called “Troika”—the bloc of creditors—toward indebted Eurozone countries following the 2008 global financial crisis, or the Trump administration’s recent initiatives targeting Venezuela and Cuba, there is a frequently cited saying used to emphasize that a rules-based order, so to speak, has been blown away: Those in power do what they can, while the weak must endure what they are forced to endure. What Thucydides’s words aim to highlight is that conducting power-balance-based analyses using the terminology of the realist approach—as defined in American political science and international relations literature—is also becoming increasingly difficult. In an environment where international law is disregarded and those with power do as they please, the concept of limited war—as an act of lawlessness—is regaining relevance amid a process where discussing the balance of power has become contentious.

LAWLESSNESS IS PART OF U.S. HISTORY

So, what does this so-called lawlessness endanger the most?

The greatest danger is this: If the rule-based order erodes and everyone acts on their own power, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states become easily vulnerable to violation. You cannot legitimize Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its invasion of Ukraine by calling it a proxy war. Similarly, you cannot justify intervention against Iran by claiming, “The regime is already bad.” If we reach the point where “those with the power do as they please,” no one can predict what will happen to whom tomorrow. This applies not only to Iran or Ukraine but also to Turkey.

When you look at the U.S.’s past actions, one thing stands out: while it has been effective in shaping the international order, there are also numerous examples of its engaging in rule-breaking behavior. There are instances of regime change through the unilateral use of military force, as well as examples of rule-breaking measures aimed at regime change without using military force—such as the economic embargo imposed on Cuba since the Kennedy administration.

Furthermore, you can observe that the U.S. has sought to unilaterally establish certain rules. When examining U.S. foreign policy historically, it is possible to identify periods during which principles for conducting foreign policy were established. These principles, associated with the U.S. presidents of the relevant eras, are described as doctrines. The Monroe Doctrine, which has begun to be invoked again under Trump, is the first of these. In the early 19th century, it was a principled approach aimed at closing the Western Hemisphere to external intervention—specifically, intervention by colonial European powers.

To provide a few more examples from the recent past, the Nixon Doctrine, following the Vietnam defeat, was a strategy aimed at protecting regional interests based on perceived threats, relying on local allies rather than direct military force. Following the collapse of the Shah’s regime in Iran, the Carter Doctrine led to the establishment of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to secure the oil-producing regions defined as a “vital interest area” through the direct use of military force. Today, it plays a critical role in the war against Iran.

You mentioned that there is a continuity of doctrine in U.S. foreign policy. Do you see such a framework today?

U.S. foreign policy has been shaped according to its own definition of interests in every era. However, as we look at the present, it is difficult to say that there is a consistent, institutionally formulated “Trump Doctrine.” There is rhetoric, but there is no strategic framework at the level of a doctrine. CENTCOM remains in place, and military capabilities persist, but it is difficult to say that these are tied to a long-term institutional strategy. It is hard to claim that the National Security Strategy published in December 2025 contains such content. Moreover, the way it defines relations with European states—allies within the NATO alliance—is fueling debates to the extent that it creates new tensions. This creates a problem of consistency in foreign policy from the perspective of the Western world.

In a process where the old order is crumbling but the new one cannot be established—a process frequently referenced in the context of Gramsci’s definition of crisis and the concept of the “interregnum”—the Trump administration’s aggressions can also be assessed as a series of pathological symptoms. Rules are eroding; the U.S. still believes it possesses the capacity to steer events, but its ability to produce results is weakening. Consequently, to the extent that it appears.

So is the real issue here that the U.S. is facing a crisis in reestablishing the order it once dominated, but the instruments for doing so are no longer as powerful as they used to be?

Yes, I think that’s the heart of the matter. The U.S. still sees itself as the central power of the system. Historically, that’s always been the case. But today, it’s unclear what the goal actually is. One day there’s one narrative, the next day another. It is also possible to observe that the U.S. has moved away from its role as a rule-setter in its approach to Israel. The U.S. has always supported Israel, but there was a balance that set limits on Israel’s “aggression. ” After October 7, 2023, however, that balance seems to have weakened. The U.S.’s guiding influence over Israel has come into question. On the contrary, there are various rumors today that Netanyahu is the one influencing Trump.

NO COUNTER-BLOCK CAN BE FORMED

So, in your opinion, what did the U.S. hope to achieve by intervening in Iran, and will it find what it sought?

As for the Iran issue… It is not enough to explain this war simply by saying, “That’s how imperialism works.” The strategic choices of capitalist states are certainly important, but they are not always decisive on their own. In this context, I do not believe it can be explained solely by the moves of capital actors—the oil lobby, Silicon Valley, lithium mines… All of these can be factors, but it is difficult to say they play a decisive role on their own.

If action was taken based on the expectation that the regime would collapse within 72 hours, that would be a serious miscalculation. It’s worth noting in passing that similar expectations were cited when Putin intervened in Ukraine in February 2022.

Now we come to the Iran conflict. Was this truly a grand strategy, or was it sheer recklessness? I believe neither explanation holds up. If there was genuinely an expectation that the regime in Iran would collapse within 72 hours, that would indicate a serious miscalculation. Because Iran is not Libya, nor is it Iraq. When Saddam was overthrown, Iraq fell apart. When Gaddafi was overthrown, Libya collapsed. In Iran, however, state operations continued despite high-level losses.

This shows us one of two things: either there was faulty intelligence or flawed analysis. Looking at the classic functioning of U.S. decision-making mechanisms—the Pentagon, State Department, Congress, intelligence agencies—such a step is typically not taken without a risk assessment. If it was taken, then there is a serious coordination issue within the system. What is evident right now is a search for “how do we get out of this?” This suggests there was no clear strategy from the start.

But there seems to be a dynamic unfolding internally as well. The election process, the balance of power in Congress, and even the Epstein case…

Of course. In the U.S., foreign policy is never independent of domestic politics. If the balance of power in Congress shifts as the November elections approach, if investigations into Trump’s second term come to the fore, or if the Democrats gain a majority, a completely different picture emerges. The growing debates within the U.S. over election integrity, the presence of armed groups at the state level, and federal authorities are also amplifying this uncertainty. So the issue isn’t just Iran. The U.S.’s own internal stability also harbors a series of question marks.

Is the failure to form an alternative bloc also a problem?

Absolutely. Europe cannot adopt a unified position internally. Spanish Prime Minister Sanchez’s statement had an impact, but there is no strong bloc behind him. There isn’t one from outside Europe either. For example, even Lula in Brazil couldn’t step forward and say, “I stand with Sanchez.” Germany is cautious. France is playing its own game. BRICS is presented as an alternative, but Modi openly supported Netanyahu. China isn’t establishing a clear ideological camp. Russia is already in its own war. Therefore, there is no clear, organized international counterbalance to the U.S. This expands the U.S.’s room to maneuver but simultaneously increases systemic instability.

Do you think this is a transitional period?

As I mentioned earlier, consider the period between 1929 and 1945. The Great Depression occurred, competition among states intensified, but at the same time, the Bretton Woods system was planned while the war was ongoing. In other words, a new institutional architecture was designed alongside the crisis. China is integrated into the system but is not establishing an alternative institutional order. BRICS exists but is not an ideological bloc; it is a pragmatic, loose network. Europe is a “union” carrying internal economic and political disagreements. Even regarding the pursuit of “strategic autonomy” against the U.S.—a buzzword of recent years—it cannot reach consensus within itself.

The institutional framework of the old order is eroding, but a new one cannot be constructed in its place. In such periods, uncertainty grows, norms weaken, and the use of force begins to be seen as more legitimate. But since a new balance has not yet been established, every crisis generates systemic risk.

What we are experiencing today is not just the Iran war. Ukraine, Taiwan, the Middle East, energy routes, financial fragility… All of these are symptoms of crises occurring during the same transitional period. That is why it would be incomplete to interpret the issue solely through the lens of a leader’s lack of foresight or the aggression of a single country. We are in a more structural moment of transition.

How do you see the end of this process?

It is possible to observe the following: An order with weakening institutional capacity, actors struggling to generate alternatives, and major powers with increasingly fragile domestic politics. The U.S. remains at the center of the system, but the gap between its capacity to steer and its capacity to produce results is widening. Europe cannot take a clear position. China is cautious. Russia is focused on its own war, and, as the recent rise in oil prices demonstrates, it is able to capitalize on internal crises within the system. This picture points to a period in which power struggles will intensify but institutional stability will remain fragile. Rather than the emergence of a new order, the likelihood of even greater upheavals appears to be the prevailing scenario. But uncertainty itself is a risk in and of itself.

Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Galip Yalman ile söyleşi: Kriz, Düzen ve Savaş, published in BirGün newspaper on April 5, 2026.