Iran after January 2026: Grief, fear and political deadlock

Mehrdad Emami - Sociologist

The January 2026 massacre marked a qualitative turning point in the cycle of protests that has defined Iran's last decade. Political pressure, economic devastation, environmental crises and social inequalities that had been building since at least 2017 exploded in December 2025–January 2026, confronting the country with one of the bloodiest waves of state violence in its modern history. Today, Iran stands on the brink of a new era, not merely following the suppression of a protest, but one where the bonds between the state and society have been severely severed.

AUSTERITY, COLLAPSE AND THE CLASS PROFILE OF THE STREET

In recent years, price liberalisation, the removal of subsidies and currency adjustments, implemented under the name of ‘structural economic reform’, have pushed large sections of Iranian society deeper into poverty. The sharp devaluation of the rial in December 2025 made the cost of living unbearable for millions of people. The first spark was lit in the Tehran bazaar; however, the real force that spread the protests across the country was precarious workers, small traders, porters, couriers, street vendors and university youth.

This expansion clearly revealed the class nature of the protests: those taking to the streets were social groups increasingly impoverished by the combined effect of imperialist sanctions and the Islamic Republic's neoliberal policies. The urban poor and lower middle classes emerged as a social bloc with little left to lose. However, in conditions where left-wing politics and class struggle discourse were weak, these segments were forced to partially align their political demands with a middle-class vision advocating for the return of the monarchy, driven by a longing for a ‘glorious past.’

THE STATE'S RESPONSE: SYSTEMATIC VIOLENCE AND MASSACRE

The regime, which initially appeared to be backing down in the face of the bazaar strike, soon revealed its harshest and most brutal face. Operations led by the Revolutionary Guards, Basij and riot police units, combined with the shutdown of the internet and all communication networks, turned into systematic mass slaughter. The gap between the 3,118 deaths officially announced by the state and the at least 7,000 deaths confirmed by independent human rights organisations, as well as the number of missing persons, which is said to reach tens of thousands, albeit unconfirmed, gives a striking idea of the true scale and severity of what happened.

The images emanating from the Kahrizak morgue in Tehran were indicative not only of physical violence but also of a trauma etched into the collective memory of society. The killing of children, the removal of the wounded from hospitals, the demand for ‘bullet fees’ from families, and forced confessions laid bare the state's naked capacity for coercion.

After January 2026, Iranian society was plunged into a deep atmosphere of mourning, fear, and paralysis. However, this fear paradoxically deepened the state's legitimacy crisis. This time, what was suppressed was not merely a wave of protest but the most fundamental life expectations, minimal dignity, and hope for the future of broad sections of society. In addition, at the funerals of those killed and at the seventh and fortieth day commemorations, it was observed that many families went beyond the boundaries of traditional Islamic mourning rituals. Singing songs at gravesides instead of mourning, transforming the death of their children into a narrative of ‘honour’ rather than a ‘farewell,’ and declaring that the lives lost were ‘sacrificed for the homeland’ indicate that a new form of mourning and public remembrance is emerging in Iran. This new language of mourning not only expresses loss; it also produces political meaning and opens up a symbolic space of resistance against the regime of fear imposed by the state.

THE RHETORIC OF ‘MOSSAD AGENTS’ AND REALITY

The rhetoric of “terrorist” and ‘Mossad agent’ played a central role in legitimising the massacre. The June 2025 war between Israel and Iran and the subsequent arrests laid the groundwork for this discourse. However, the profile of those arrested – Kurdish kolbers, poor Baluchis, Afghan migrant workers – reveals the class and ethnic dimensions of the regime's claims.

While it is possible that Israel exploited security vulnerabilities within Iran, reducing the mass character of the protests in Iran to a ‘foreign agent’ conspiracy distorts reality. In a society where poverty is so deep-rooted, the possibility of low-cost intelligence activities does not justify equating the mass anger of the people with foreign intervention. This narrative served both the regime's internal suppression strategy and the regional powers' own narratives of interest.

THE FAR-RIGHT OPPOSITION'S JUSTIFICATION OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION

Another defining aspect of January 2026 was the internal balance of the opposition. Reza Pahlavi's call for mass mobilisation on 8–9 January invited a society with limited organisational capacity to directly confront the state. The rhetoric of ‘this is the final battle’ created dangerous illusions among broad sections of society that the security forces were about to collapse and that external intervention was imminent.

Donald Trump's hints of possible intervention and military activity in the region fuelled these expectations. However, the result was that unarmed crowds faced one of the bloodiest crackdowns in history. Claims that the ‘regime had collapsed,’ previously voiced by monarchist circles, resulted in a much heavier price in January 2026.

This situation starkly exposed the structural problems of the Iranian opposition: the deep tension between the mass movement representing street anger and class demands, and the externally supported rhetoric of regime change. Although pro-Pahlavi slogans were visible in the protests, it was clear that this line failed to offer a realistic and positive political programme encompassing the whole of society.

The January 2026 massacre and the nationwide crackdown, combined with widespread arrests, torture in prisons, and intense pressure on the families of those killed and detained, created such a sense of helplessness among certain segments within Iran that US intervention and external support to remove the leaders of the Islamic Republic and its apparatus of repression became almost a ‘principle of common sense’. The post-massacre trauma, uncertainty and disruption of daily life; along with the promise by the leader of the ‘National Revolution’ or ‘Lion and Sun Revolution’ (the name given to the recent protests by Reza Pahlavi and his supporters) that the regime would collapse after foreign intervention, has led to the emergence of a new perception of the resurgence of extreme right-wing nationalism in Iran. This nationalism, even before coming to power, has promoted itself with a fascist slogan such as ‘One nation, one flag, one leader’ and has targeted oppressed peoples such as mullahs, leftists, supporters of the People's Mujahedeen Organisation, and especially Kurds.

NEW ERA: DARK DAYS ON THE BRINK OF WAR

Although mass street mobilisation in Iran appears to have temporarily subsided since January 2026, the dynamics of the crisis have not disappeared. Economic contraction, heavy sanctions, regional tensions and the state's increasingly security-oriented approach continue to build social pressure.

Today, the Iranian people are caught in a triple squeeze: Internally, a state that is rapidly losing legitimacy, feeding on violence and recklessly dragging society into war without mobilising it; externally, imperialist powers preparing the ground for war; and at the same time, an extreme right-wing opposition that is unable to produce a democratic and inclusive alternative, attempting to impose regime change on society as a ‘national revolution’ through external intervention.

The January massacre may have enabled the regime to establish control in the short term; however, this control is based entirely on naked force and repression, not on consent. This situation is dragging Iran into a much more fragile and uncertain future, both socially and politically.

Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Ocak 2026 sonrası İran: Yas, korku ve siyasal çıkmaz, published in BirGün newspaper on March 1, 2026.