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The problem is that Europe, suddenly left vulnerable by the Trump administration's blow to US-European relations, is looking for new defence alliances with Turkey, and Greece and the Republic of Cyprus are making various countermoves against this potential alliance.

The Cyprus crisis of AKP

Yusuf Tuna Koç

Last week we left behind a period in which the government faced one crisis after another not only at home but also abroad. The appointment of ambassadors to Southern Cyprus by the member states of the Organisation of Turkic States, the crisis with Israel becoming more visible, and the gradual weakening of the support they expected from Europe during the March 19 process have led to comments that the AKP is experiencing a crisis abroad as well.

This week, we discussed the regime's crisis over Cyprus, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean with Assoc. Prof. Dr. Yonca Özdemir and retired diplomat Engin Solakoğlu.

Turkey-Greece relations have been tense for a long time, the stance of the European Union and the recent assignment of embassies to Southern Cyprus by the member states of the Organisation of Turkish States raise questions about the government's policies in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus and the Aegean. How do you evaluate these events, are we in a new crisis in the Mediterranean?

Yonca Özdemir: It is true that Turkey-Greece relations have been tense in recent days. Since 2023, there was supposedly a Turkish-Greek normalisation process. However, as both countries are headed by leaders with nationalist rhetoric, I think the tensions are not surprising. Of course, sometimes these tensions can escalate more than normal. Although there is no active conflict, we can say that we are currently in a tense period, as several events have occurred one after the other.

MAP OF MARITIME BORDERS

Let us start with the most recent one: The ‘spatial maritime planning’ adopted by Greece in accordance with the European Union (EU) legislation, which resulted in new maps in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, which are in conflict with Turkey's claims and therefore not accepted by Turkey. According to these new maps, an area of authority of 12 nautical miles has been granted to Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, and thus more than 70 % of the Aegean Sea is under Greek sovereignty. Although it sounds quite daring, this is not a new situation. Greece wants to increase its territorial waters, which are currently 6 miles, to 12 miles at every opportunity, and this issue creates tension between Turkey and Greece from time to time. In 1995, when this issue was on the agenda, Turkey had declared it as a ‘cause for war’. In other words, Greece has brought the 12-mile goal to the agenda with various political statements, maps or plans before, but has never been able to put it into practice. Therefore, in my opinion, there is nothing to panic about. Greece continues with its usual maximalist attitude and avoids making an agreement with Turkey regarding its jurisdiction in the Aegean Sea.

On the legal side, since Greece became a party to the 1982 United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea, Greece has been claiming that the 12-mile upper limit in this convention is its ‘natural right’. Turkey, on the other hand, is not a party to this convention and argues that there are Greek islands in the Aegean Sea very close to its mainland and that the problem should be solved through a fair agreement between Turkey and Greece, as seen in other examples around the world. As a matter of fact, the UN convention in question does not automatically give countries the right to 12 miles, as Greece claims, but allows them to extend their authorisation up to 12 miles if the conditions are appropriate.

Of course, I must emphasise that Turkey's Blue Homeland maps, like Greece's Mediterranean maps, are exaggerated. They both represent conflicting national interests that require diplomatic interaction to resolve.

ELECTRICITY CABLE

In connection with this map incident, there was also an electricity interconnector project crisis in early April. This €1.9 billion project, known as the ‘Great Sea Interconnector’ (GSI), which is planned to be built between Greece and Cyprus with the help of Israel, will connect Europe's electricity transmission networks to Cyprus and then extend across the Mediterranean to Israel. With the full support of Israel and the financial backing of the European Union, the GSI is seen as a strategic project for Cyprus' energy security. The marine surveys carried out for the project received a backlash from Turkey. The issuance of a Navtex (navigational warning) for the project's offshore surveys has been postponed for the time being due to the sensitivity of the situation, which has been further complicated by increasing rhetoric from Ankara.

Turkey has repeatedly voiced its opposition to the project. The Turkish Defence Ministry calls the planned activities ‘provocative’ and accuses Greece and Cyprus of proceeding without Turkey's permission. Turkey claims that the electricity project violates its rights, citing a memorandum on maritime zones signed with the interim Libyan government. Greece considers Turkey's memorandum with Libya invalid. Greece seems determined to proceed with the electricity connection to Cyprus despite Turkish opposition but has kept secret the timetable for resuming exploration operations under increasing pressure from Turkey. The published ‘spatial maritime planning’ maps seem to be related to this issue. In other words, this electricity project issue is also creating new tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and it seems that it will continue to create tensions.

CYPRUS-TURKISH REPUBLICS

Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have officially recognised Southern Cyprus and appointed ambassadors to the Republic of Cyprus. As you know, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) was made an observer member of the Organisation of Turkic States in 2022 with Turkey's intense pressure. Turkey has also been making efforts for 2-3 years for these countries to recognise the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC). Within the scope of the policy of ‘two-state solution’ that KKTC President Ersin Tatar insisted on with the support of Turkey, making the KKTC an observer member of the Organisation of Turkic States was portrayed as a great success. It was even rumoured that Azerbaijan would officially recognise the KKTC. It was a great disappointment for Turkey that the three Turkic republics did not recognise the KKTC and improved their relations with Southern Cyprus, which was the opposite of what was expected. Especially in terms of Turkey's Cyprus policy since 2020, it is possible to characterise this as a complete "fiasco" and "strategic failure".

When we look at the situation from the perspective of the Turkic republics, we see that these states are trying to improve their relations with the West and are taking a position considering their own interests. While they are under intense pressure from Russia and China due to their geopolitical position and while the balances in the world are shifting, they do not intend to take the risk of distancing themselves from the West by recognising the KKTC. On the contrary, they choose to improve relations with the Republic of Cyprus in order to get closer to the EU. In particular, relations between Kazakhstan and Southern Cyprus had already been developing for some time. Therefore, their decision was not a surprise. This decision may have been a surprise only for the KKTC.

Why?

Of course, it is not a coincidence that Greece and the Republic of Cyprus have taken the offensive against Turkey in many areas. The problem is that Europe, which has suddenly been left vulnerable by the Trump administration's blow to US-European relations, has been looking for new defence alliances with Turkey, and Greece and Cyprus have been making various counter moves against this possibility.

In recent months, there has been a growing awareness at the EU level that it is no longer possible to rely on the US side. Turkey, as you know, is a NATO ally and the number one country in NATO after the US in terms of defence, especially in terms of troop and tank strength. Moreover, Turkey has come to the forefront with its defence industry breakthroughs in recent years, especially in the fields of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and naval ship production. Considering its location close to both Ukraine and the Middle East, it is impossible to consider Europe's security apart from Turkey. As a matter of fact, as soon as Europeans started to recover from the Trump shock, they remembered Turkey again. Turkey was first invited to a major summit in London on 2 March to discuss Ukraine's security and Europe's comprehensive defence posture. Turkey was also invited to the EU leaders' summit in Brussels on 20-21 March. This started the debate on ‘Are EU-Turkey relations on the improve? However, I am not sure how long these developments will continue under today's conditions.

In fact, there are two possibilities: A short-term, transactional alliance between Turkey and Europe, or the long-term integration of Turkey into the European security structure. It seems that Europe is most likely to do the former during the AKP government. On 19 March, the European Commission announced its new security strategy, known as the White Paper. This strategy includes increasing military spending and production, as well as allocating resources to joint defence projects until 2030. While Turkey, as a candidate country, could have been part of this strategy, it was excluded from the EU's new defence financing mechanism. Moreover, the Bulletin emphasises the need for Turkey to align with EU priorities, particularly with regard to resolving the Cyprus problem and stabilising the Eastern Mediterranean region. Turkey's participation in European joint defence programmes is also difficult due to the unanimity requirement. So you can be sure that these Mediterranean and Cypriot requirements have been raised, especially by Greece and Cyprus. Of course, these are not conditions that cannot be overcome by peaceful relations and peace negotiations, but AKP policies are not in this direction at the moment.

In fact, Turkey has a lot to offer for European security and could use this to its great advantage, but there is a bigger obstacle than Greece or the Republic of Cyprus: a lack of trust. If Turkey were a democratic state of law, it would be a country that inspires confidence and could now have its best chance in the EU. The authoritarian AKP regime's attempt to consolidate itself by arresting Imamoğlu and using violence against protesting protesters is a major obstacle to European trust in Turkey. Europe, which is already dealing with authoritarianised countries such as Hungary and Slovakia, will certainly avoid bringing another problematic country into its fold or even getting closer to it. For Europe to accept Turkey into the European security coalition in its current state would be to ignore the dramatic deterioration of the rule of law. It would be a success for Turkish-style authoritarian regimes and would ultimately undermine Europe's values and principles. Indeed, in these last weeks Europe has become more distant from Turkey.

CYPRIOTS RESIST ATTEMPTS AT SOCIAL ENGINEERING

To summarise, Turkey has many important international opportunities in today's unstable world order. However, Turkey fails to make good use of these opportunities for two reasons. First, the AKP government overestimates its own power and makes maximalist plans without taking into account the power and interests of other actors. These maximalist plans, in turn, attract reactions in international relations and are immediately disrupted by other actors. Secondly, Turkey cannot establish close enough relations with Europe due to its authoritarian regime. This gives Greece and the Republic of Cyprus the opportunity to insist on and legitimise their maximalist stances, and from time to time, it paves the way for them to ‘score goals’, so to speak, against Turkey.

Last but not least, let me mention the following: Turkey is currently being protested even in the KKTC, which it claims to support and defend. The pressure exerted by some sections of the Turkish population, with the support of the Turkish embassy, on the issue of the headscarf in schools is being met with reaction by teachers' unions and a large section of the public, and protests are being organised every day. The spread of Turkish-backed sects on the island has been rumoured for a long time and Turkish Cypriots are very angry about Turkey's social engineering efforts. I would like to note this as a separate diplomatic fiasco.

Note: This text has been translated from the original Turkish version titled AKP’nin Kıbrıs Krizi, published in BirGün newspaper on April 20, 2025.