The Erdoğan–Bahçeli–Öcalan alliance has its limits: it began in Damascus, but where will it end?
The new Middle East that emerged with Assad's overthrow is poised to shift the balance in Turkey's domestic politics. The new situation has created a new alignment. However, it is almost impossible for this political alignment to progress smoothly.
The shifting balance of power in Syria, the US's regional plan involving Turkey, and the resulting change in stance on the Kurdish issue have affected the domestic political balance. The AKP–MHP bloc's hawkish stance on the Kurdish issue, which had continued for nearly 10 years, suddenly gave way to dialogue. With the resolution process, the government's acceptance of Öcalan as a negotiating partner brought a broader alliance, including DEM, back to the agenda. Erdoğan expressed this by saying, ‘We are determined to see this through to the end as the AKP–MHP and DEM.’
However, looking at these developments and the statements coming from Imrali and the government, it would be a gross misjudgement to write DEM off as part of the ruling bloc. The current contact points to a temporary and fragile relationship rather than an alliance.
NOW MORE COMPLEX
The Kurdish issue is being discussed at a time when the Syrian theatre and internal power calculations in Turkey are tightly intertwined. With the overthrow of Assad in Syria and the decline of Russia's influence, the US and Israel have become the dominant powers in the region. A new Middle East has been defined, with the Kurds included, and Turkey has been assigned a role in this direction. Erdoğan said ‘yes’ to this project because of both the opportunity for regional expansion and the potential for this alliance to strengthen his power domestically. Bahçeli gave his support, focusing on security policies. Öcalan also declared that he would make a significant contribution in this regard.
US-Israeli policy made the equation formed in Syria and regional developments challenging for Ankara.
The Kurdish political movement, on the other hand, viewed developments positively, particularly those in Syria, and believed that a new space had opened up for it.
In summary, with US policy becoming dominant in the region, Erdoğan's continued rule, Bahçeli's security policies and the consolidation of the regime, and DEM's opportunity to become one of the founding actors of the new process, they are now positioned behind the same line.
This line draws its strength from Syria. It advances through regional cooperation imposed by the situation on the ground. When it comes to Turkey, however, it is limited to meeting the needs of the ruling bloc.
CAN POWER EMERGE FROM THIS TRAP?
Devlet Bahçeli's insistent rhetoric, Erdoğan's backing of the process, and Öcalan's efforts to convince those who have supported Kurdish politics to date, particularly his own community, are not enough to bring the process to a successful conclusion. The AKP has suffered defeat in the political line it has pursued in the Middle East for 15 years. Domestically, it has created economic, political and social collapse. This destruction has led to deep rifts between the AKP and its voters.
Devlet Bahçeli has virtually staked his and his party's political future on the continuation of this regime. He knows what the collapse of the worn-out regime would mean for the MHP. DEM, on the other hand, quickly realised that it was pointless to stand against the winds blowing from Syria and supported by Öcalan. Öcalan's political orientation coincides with DEM's demands.
With the addition of the US factor to all this, it would not be wrong to expect the relationship between the AKP, MHP and DEM to develop further in the coming days.
WHO IS LOOKING AT THE POLLS?
In recent days, there have been numerous reports that the contact established with DEM has led to a loss of votes in the ruling bloc. It is even claimed that Erdoğan has taken a step back in the process for this reason.
However, as long as the tension between HTŞ and YPG in Syria persists and the US does not create a new situation in the region that excludes or restricts the Kurds, it is difficult for the process that has begun in Turkey to come to a halt. On the contrary, with Trump's support behind him, the appetite to generate domestic political gains from this ‘regional vision’ will increase. Therefore, it is developments in Syria, not polls, that are decisive for the AKP and MHP.
Erdoğan, with his political experience, also sees that voter behaviour is ‘manipulable’.
Contrary to what might be expected, it appears that the party that will face a greater voter problem here is DEM. Despite its strong support for the solution process, the Kurdish electorate does not want Erdoğan and is opposed to the continuation of the regime. This situation naturally keeps DEM in the opposition camp.
Public opinion polls show that three main trends determine the behaviour of Kurdish voters in Turkey:
•Urban and secular voters are opposed to rapprochement with the AKP and MHP and remain loyal to the line established by Kurdish politics after 2015.
• Voters in the region who have not forgotten the events between 7 June and 1 November and who have suffered from the trustee policy say yes to peace but have not yet been convinced by Erdoğan and Bahçeli.
• There is a third group that has distanced itself from the AKP but is not affiliated with DEM. These are the ones most enthusiastic about the solution process.
The picture shows that without the AKP–MHP bloc taking a democratic step on the Kurdish issue and without a change in the country's political climate, it will be difficult even for Öcalan to convince Kurdish voters. Especially without a strong figure like Demirtaş.
HOW WILL THE KNOT BE UNTIED?
It is not only Kurdish voters who are dissatisfied and oppose the regime. The overwhelming majority of the country wants change. However, there is no political subject or vehicle for this demand. Politics is locked up right here.
On one side is the AKP–MHP, which instrumentalises all developments at home and abroad to maintain their power and the regime they have established. On the other side is the CHP, which has been demonised for opposing this order and uniting around a name to seek power. With many mayors, including its presidential candidate, in prison, and spending a significant portion of its time fighting the judiciary, the CHP has managed to hold on to a position above 30 per cent as a reward for its resistance; however, it is still far from defeating the ruling party.
The demands of 70 per cent of society, including pensioners, women, young people, university students and farmers, whose lives are made difficult by the one-man regime, are not being met. What will change this ‘stagnant’ situation in favour of the opposition is the transformation of scattered objections into a common political call. There is a need for a strategy that builds principled and consistent political lines that transcend the regime's limits on all issues, including imperialist domination, the Kurdish question, and the economic crisis, and that expands the social organisation linked to these lines. Breaking the regional-internal political equation established by the ruling party and bringing it down will only be possible in this way.
Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Erdoğan–Bahçeli–Öcalan ittifakinin sınırları var: Şam’da başladı, nerede bitecek?, published in BirGün newspaper on December 12, 2025.
