The price of intervention in Iran

Yusuf Tuna Koç

Last week, nuclear talks between the US and Iran resumed. The revival of the agreement signed by Obama in 2015 but shelved during Trump's first term was not an attempt to establish common ground between the two countries, but rather an effort to put more pressure on Iran. Moreover, by bringing its war fleets to the region before the talks began, mediated by Oman, the US had made its true intentions clear. The general consensus regarding the talks, which lasted until yesterday, was that a solution would not be reached and that Iran would gain time to delay the possibility of intervention. The expected happened, but it was Israel, not the US, that struck Iran.

At the time these pages went to press, Iran had only just begun to respond. Indeed, all the Middle East expert journalists we spoke to during the week shared the common view, as you will read below, that intervention was inevitable. And so it was. The individuals we spoke to were certain that the main purpose of this negotiation-intervention dilemma was to bring about regime change in Iran or to weaken the regime, thereby enabling Israel to run rampant in the region as it wished. Shortly after these discussions, this certainty was proven. Since 7 October, Israel, which has been attacking all countries in the region, from Palestine to Lebanon, from Yemen to Syria, and their peoples, has finally struck its ultimate target, Iran. However, there should be no question as to where the bombs came from or who owns the weapons. Israel is carrying out these attacks not despite the US negotiation process, but as part of that very process. The US Congress, which has broken records in providing military and economic support to Israel over the past two and a half years, supports the operations of its forward bases in Tel Aviv as part of its own imperialist expansionism in the Middle East. While Trump is directly dealing with Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia and Cuba, he is indirectly supporting aggression against Iran with billions of dollars in aid, warships and military support. The imperialists' thirst for blood is oppressing people around the world simultaneously on an unprecedented scale.

This week, for BirGün Pazar, we discussed with Hediye Levent the political and economic reasons behind the now-realised intervention in Iran from the perspective of the US and Israel, the crises it will create, and Turkey's possible role.

Talks between the US and Iran are ongoing, but the possibility of US military intervention has not been taken off the table. How do you interpret the process? Do you see any change?

The negotiation process is ongoing, but the parties have yet to show any serious flexibility. The Americans have not been able to get Iran to accept their demands on certain issues. We are not at a stage where concessions have been made on both sides and a compromise is within reach.

Both sides continue to take the approach of ‘negotiations should proceed on my terms’. Therefore, there is no clear green light for a compromise yet.

Iran has certain elements it can rely on. Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, are seriously concerned about a potential American attack on Iran. If the US strikes Iran, the first region to be affected would be the Persian Gulf. Even if the Strait of Hormuz is not closed, oil transportation would face serious security risks.

At the very least, insurance costs for tanker ships would rise. This would lead to an increase in oil prices. Countries such as Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates would be directly affected. Some of them have no outlet outside the Gulf.

Iran seems to be relying on the approach that ‘if you strike me, not only will I be affected, but the countries in the region will also be affected.’ This is not entirely unfounded confidence. We know that Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, are engaged in intense diplomacy to prevent an attack on Iran.

Even if negotiations continue, the possibility of US military operations has not been ruled out. In fact, it never was. The concrete manifestation of this is the presence of the American navy in the region. The Abraham Lincoln has been in the region for a long time. Moreover, these ships are not alone; they are accompanied by elements such as nuclear-tipped submarines. The US is sending the message that ‘the military option is on the table, so be aware of this when you sit down at the table.’

A WEAK MULLA IS PREFERABLE TO UNCERTAINTY

Do you think the US will attack Iran?

I consider the possibility of the US attacking Iran to be high. However, I do not think it will be on a scale that will destroy Iran and completely collapse the regime.

It is more likely to be limited but message-laden attacks targeting strategic points, facilities belonging to the Revolutionary Guards, or symbolic figures of the regime. Uranium enrichment facilities or nuclear infrastructure could be targeted. After all, we are talking about Trump. He may say, ‘I can't wait any longer.’ However, I do not expect a regime change operation similar to Iraq.

From the perspective of the US and Israel, a weakened but controllable Iranian regime is a more preferable scenario than uncertainty. It is unclear what would follow the overthrow of the regime. Iran's geography is complex. Nationalist reflexes could strengthen. The country could be plunged into chaos. Afghanistan lies to the east of Iran. The removal of this buffer could create greater regional chaos. Therefore, a scenario of military pressure that would force concessions at the negotiating table, rather than completely collapsing Iran, seems more likely.

Turkey appears to have maintained a neutral stance in diplomacy since the beginning of the negotiations. Is the government, which has been openly interventionist in Iraq and Syria, more cautious on Iran?

Turkey's approach to Iran differs from that towards Iraq and Syria. Turkey-Iran relations can be described as ‘rival allies’. They compete when they are face to face on the ground, but when there is an external threat to Iran, Turkey generally takes a balancing position against that threat.

A chaotic situation in Iran could have more serious consequences than in Syria or Iraq. In addition to calculable risks such as migration, security risks and oil prices, there are also incalculable uncertainties.

Furthermore, from Israel's perspective, Iran is the biggest obstacle in the region. The complete dismantling of Iran would mean Israel could operate more freely in the region. The collapse of Iran would mean Israel becoming stronger in Syria and Iraq too. This could mean a more intense Israeli influence on two of Turkey's borders. Turkey does not want this.

Turkey's goal is for any change in Iran to come from within, driven by the people. Not through external intervention, American pressure or an Israeli attack. Alongside this, Turkey may also be aiming to re-engage in regional affairs by taking on a mediating role in the Iran-US-Israel crisis. It failed to achieve this position in Gaza, remained in the background in Lebanon, and gained only limited ground in Syria. The Iran dossier could open up a diplomatic space for Turkey.

However, this situation is also causing unease in some countries in the region. There are reservations that Turkey could turn this crisis into a show.

THE IRANIAN DIASPORA IS NOT JUST PEHLEVI

Will the announcement by Kurdish groups to unite against the regime have an impact on the situation in Turkey?

It is true that five Kurdish groups have announced a joint struggle against the Iranian regime. However, it is too early to speak of a Syria-like scenario at this stage.

Kurdish structures in Iran do not have a direct agenda with Turkey. Their struggle is largely centred on Iran. The PKK's influence is limited, and the unification of these five groups does not mean they have gained the power to overthrow the Iranian regime. Not all of the Kurdish population in Iran is pro-independence. There are also segments that are part of the current order.

It is also incorrect to compare them to the SDF in Syria. For a similar structure to emerge in Iran, a very long process, serious regional and international support, and logistical lines are required. Therefore, at this stage, there is no perception of a threat similar to that in Syria.

However, Kurdish groups in Iran are perceived as a threat by the Iranian regime. Turkey can turn this situation to its diplomatic advantage through intelligence and regional contacts. However, Iran has a very complex social structure: Turks, Persians, Kurds, Arabs. Not all of these groups are against the current regime. In fact, there are people of Turkish origin in Iran's top echelons. Therefore, it is uncertain how the masses would react if the US or Israel attacked. A nationalist unity could also occur in the face of external intervention.

The Iranian diaspora is not like the Syrian or Iraqi diaspora. It is an influential diaspora with a high intellectual level and economic power. There are segments that oppose the current regime but are also against the overthrow of the regime through external intervention. Therefore, there is no single voice. Pahlavi's voice may be loud, but the Iranian diaspora is not limited to him.

Note: This article is translated from the original article titled İran’a müdahalenin maliyeti olacak, published in BirGün newspaper on March 1, 2026.