What did the Kremlin say and what did it conceal?

Yaren Çolak

A year has passed. It has been exactly one year since Bashar al-Assad left Syria following the overthrow of his government and arrived in Moscow. During this year, neither Assad has spoken out nor has the Kremlin made any clear statements about the political situation. So, amid this silence, what did the opposition say, what did the media write, and what scenarios did analysts discuss?

On 8 December 2024, when jihadists seized power in Syria, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed that day that Assad and his family had moved to Moscow and requested asylum on humanitarian grounds. However, after Peskov's initial confirmation, there was no further official statement from the Kremlin regarding Assad and his family; the silence was maintained.

CLAIMS FROM BEHIND THE SCENES

The West wrote and drew. Imperialist ambitions and the new order built on the triangle of the US, Israel and Turkey graced the front pages of newspapers. The question ‘What is Bashar al-Assad doing now?’ was frequently raised. Even tabloid reports circulated, describing Assad as ‘the richest refugee’ and claiming he lived in a luxury residence in Moscow City and spent his days playing computer games. The political significance of the event was trivialised by rumours, with attempts to portray Assad as a mere magazine figure.

However, information leaked from behind the scenes painted a very different picture. International news agencies and independent Russian media claimed that some figures from the old regime were attempting to reorganise via Moscow. According to these sources, some of the individuals in question are in Moscow and their efforts are still in the organisational and financing stages.

In particular, it is alleged that former intelligence chief Kamal Hassan and businessperson Rami Makhlouf, who is close to the regime, are planning to establish militia groups in Syria's Alawite-dominated coastal regions. According to Reuters, these figures are transferring millions of dollars to tens of thousands of potential fighters with the aim of launching a potential uprising against the country's new government.

Sources also report Hassan's constant telephone conversations and coordination efforts with commanders from his villa in Moscow. Some analyses still assess the activities of this former regime circle in Syria as a potential comeback or influence network.

As for Assad himself, he is not currently engaged in active political activity, but contrary to tabloid reports in Western media, he is not spending his days playing computer games or wandering the streets of Moscow in a black veil. According to behind-the-scenes sources, the search for a new sphere of power and influence in Syria through the old regime's circle is still ongoing. Russian independent newspaper analyses describe this situation as a ‘cautious search for influence.’ However, Russia has prioritised securing its military bases in Syria and its strategic presence in the Mediterranean. Again, according to backroom discussions, although the Kremlin closely monitors the activities of Assad and his entourage, it does not provide any support.

SCENARIOS PUT FORWARD

Assad's presence in Moscow is as important and actively debated as the new order being established in Syria. Dozens of scenarios have been written about those behind it and how the Putin government will turn the Syrian issue into a bargaining chip in the future.

The most striking idea, supported by a wide range of circles, is that Assad is a ‘frozen strategic asset’ for the Kremlin. According to this scenario, Assad will be an important weapon in the Russian government's hands when a hard bargaining chip is needed in regional negotiations. The current silence is simply a matter of waiting for the right moment.

Experts with closer ties to the state, however, suggest a more nuanced scenario: Assad provides Russia with the opportunity for ‘controlled instability’ in Syria. In other words, if the jihadist regime in Damascus acts against Russian interests, the option of provoking internal opposition or reminding Moscow of an ‘alternative centre’ remains on the table.

The vast majority of foreign policy experts, however, point to Iran. Tehran's deep commitment to Assad provides Moscow with political leverage to compel Iran to exercise restraint in its regional behaviour.

WHAT IS THE RUSSIAN LEFT SAYING?

The Pravda newspaper carried the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria on its front page. The article, which revealed the Russian left's stance and attitude from day one, stated: “What is happening in Syria is one of the most horrific operations carried out by international terrorism and American imperialism to steal a people's destiny. Bashar al-Assad was like the last bastion defending secularism, independence and the idea of a social state in the Middle East. His overthrow marks the beginning of a dark period for the peoples of the region. Russia granting him asylum is a humanitarian duty and a demonstration of our consistency in the fight against imperialism.”

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) also voiced this sentiment in the Duma. The left repeated this statement, made on the first day, over time.

The point where all these claims, behind-the-scenes information, debates and statements intersect is this: Assad and his allies' account in the region has not yet been settled.

Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Kremlin ne söyledi ne sakladı?, published in BirGün newspaper on December 10, 2025.