Will the opposition take the “elixir” again?

Mehmet Emin Kurnaz

In the Palace administration’s game plan, which is trying to dominate politics until the election, there is no rabbit to be pulled out of a hat. On the one hand, pressure on the CHP and the social opposition continues without any reduction in intensity and on the other, the “solution” issue and the effort to position itself in line with the new alignment in the Middle East continues. While the country’s urgent problems, above all poverty, are swept under the carpet, hero stories in foreign policy will be kept on the agenda through the Israel tension, the Iran issue and the tensions in Syria. The tension created through conservative pressure and reactionary impositions serves as an apparatus to keep the masses in hand and consolidate them. If things go as planned in this process and President Erdoğan can also provide partial relief through an election economy, only then will he feel ready for the election. Erdoğan has once again drawn on the board the formula of that elixir which he has repeated for so many years and which he believes succeeded, and which now contains no secret. Whether to take it without hesitation or to throw it away depends on the will shown by the CHP and all forces of the social opposition.

WHAT TRUMPS DOES THE GOVERNMENT HAVE?

Let’s unpack a little more the trumps that the government, sitting at the table with its cards face up, puts forward:

• A stick for the opposition: Keeping the opposition under pressure, especially CHP-run municipalities, is undoubtedly the most important part of the game plan. With the 19 March operations, the CHP was meant to be confined to Silivri and courtrooms. The Aziz İhsan Aktaş Case that began last week, the Party Congress Case to be heard on 23 February and the İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality Case that will begin on 9 March are tools to keep the CHP constantly in a defensive position. The jailing of the CHP’s presidential candidate İmamoğlu and the cancellation of his diploma mean pushing the rival out of the race. The same could happen to the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality Mayor Mansur Yavaş in the future. In addition, many examples such as the stance taken against the 19 March protests and the continued detention of Gezi prisoners serve as warnings delivered to the social opposition.
• Solution debates: More than a year has passed since the process that began with Bahçeli’s call to Öcalan yet not a single democratic step has been taken to date. The clashes in Syria between SDF and the jihadist HTŞ forces have for some time also raised tensions domestically. Even if a ceasefire is secured in the region, mutual volleys between the actors of the process have continued. The government partners apply a carrot-and-stick tactic, at times with statements reaching as far as the right to hope for Öcalan and at times saying “the outstretched hand turns into a fist”. It must be recalled from the outset that the entire process is being shaped according to the new design in the Middle East. Beyond that, the plan operates to pull the DEM Party and Kurds away from the opposition front and to offer Erdoğan the presidential seat once again.
• Changing the agenda: Even if other topics are discussed in politics, the regime’s biggest fear is that the people’s burning problems come onto the agenda and that politics is shaped accordingly. Every heading about the people’s real problems virtually panics the Palace administration. It is wanted that nobody talks about the main issue, brings it onto the agenda, debates it or objects. One reason for keeping the opposition constantly on the defensive is also to prevent issues like pensions, the minimum wage, unemployment and cost-of-living pressures from coming onto the agenda.
• Tale of heroism: The government tried to derive a share for itself from each of these headings: the clashes in Syria between the Damascus administration and SDF, the Iran tension in the region and Israel’s occupation of Palestine. A few months before the solution process even began, we heard messages about “strengthening the internal front” from Erdoğan, Bahçeli and the Palace’s Chief Adviser Mehmet Uçum. The “Israel threat” was presented as a basis for this line. Every Erdoğan speech was framed as a “challenge” and splashed across pro-government headlines. Yet it was debated that trade was not even cut and that the tension did not go beyond consolidating the masses.
• Election economics: Even if the plan we listed above works smoothly, the regime’s task is not easy. Because the full burden of the crisis, the most burning problem, is on the people’s backs. The anger building up at the base, above all over pensions and the minimum wage, also frightens the government circle. Pro-government commentators repeatedly issue “warnings” to the government about this. But the main heading under which the government will feel ready to bring the ballot box is the illusion of relief. It can do this only by raising taxes and increasing the reserves it can use. Last year, half of the more than 11 trillion lira in tax collection was taken from consumers’ pockets indirectly. On the other hand, according to the data announced by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, reserves are breaking records. In the week of 23 January, they rose to 215 billion 614 million dollars, reaching the highest level of all time. When the election period begins, possible rises in wages and pensions have turned into a habit of election investment. In this process, it will be sought to create a partial sense of relief in citizens’ perceptions.

ERDOĞAN’S HAND IS OPEN, SO WHAT WILL THE OPPOSITION DO?

What we have described so far is Erdoğan’s roadmap. Whether he will succeed once again depends on what the forces of the opposition do. The government aimed to confine the opposition to courtrooms and to Party Congresses that repeat endlessly. The CHP tried to produce a response to pressure and lawlessness with dozens of rallies, held in İstanbul on weekdays and in a province in Anatolia at weekends. In these rallies, the people’s burning problems were also put on the agenda. It managed to gather enthusiastic crowds in places described as the government’s strongholds, such as Yozgat, Çorum, Bayburt and Konya. But rallies alone were not enough to stop the regime’s pressures.

On the other hand, the wind of social opposition that emerged against the 19 March operations, which the government did not expect, continues to have an effect even if it sometimes weakens, from universities to high schools, from the actions of life defenders to farmers, from metal workers to Migros warehouse workers. What is critical here is whether the opposition can succeed against the regime by saying “my candidate will solve it, bring the ballot box”, or by rejecting the regime at its root with the broadest opposition forces and by putting forward alternative programmes. It is also clear that the second path cannot be reached easily but that there is no other way in the struggle against the regime.

Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Muhalefet ‘iksir’i bir kez daha içecek mi?, published in BirGün newspaper on February 4, 2026.